OVERSIGHT OF U.S. REGIONAL COUNTERDRUG EFFORTS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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OVERSIGHT OF U.S. REGIONAL COUNTERDRUG EFFORTS

THURSDAY, MARCH 12, 1998

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:18 p.m., in room 2154 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Dennis Hastert (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Hastert, Mica, Barr, Barrett, and Cummings.

Staff present: Robert Charles, staff director/chief counsel; Sean Littlefield, professional staff member; Amy Davenport, clerk; and Michael Yeager, minority counsel.

Mr. HASTERT. This hearing of the Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice will please come to order.

Before we start, I want to thank General Wilhelm for joining members of the subcommittee last week for our oversight trip down in Fort Benning in Georgia. I think it was beneficial. I think all Members learned a great deal and I certainly appreciate your time. We know how valuable it is to spend that time with us.

In today's hearing, we're going to receive testimony from three distinguished witnesses, representing three central anti-drug agencies, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Department of Defense, and the Drug Enforcement Administration.

Drug abuse in America, especially among our youth, is at a tragic level, and international drug-trafficking, as many of you know, is a growing national security threat. No less than 10,000 Americans lose their lives each year to drugs and drug crime. Honestly, this is unforgivable, because most of those who have died are our kids. Drugs undermine our communities, spread and finance gang violence, and destroy young lives. These are innocent, and often unsuspecting, young adults, kids who look up to us for leadership and they're the ones who are at the center of this whole issue and we owe them our leadership.

Today, as we listen to these witnesses, I urge you to keep in mind that there is a close link between drug violence in our cities and towns, and Federal efforts to stop these drugs before they get to America. If we don't stop drugs at the source or in transit, then the heroin and cocaine manufactured in South America will end up

on our street corners, in baggies, in vials, and needles available to our kids.

Let me explain our basic mission: In this Congress, we want to promote policies that will lead to victory to erasing scourge. We don't want promises that are 10 years out. We want results. Last year, this subcommittee passed the Drug-Free Communities Act of 1997. This will potentially add $100,000, which is really a drop in the bucket, but, when you add it up $100,000 for every community in America willing to create an anti-drug coalition.

I believe that you have to fight the drug war on two fronts. You have to fight it here in the United States, on our street corners, in our cities, in ghettos, and suburbs. But, you also have to fight it at the source. Right now, we are looking at our borders and beyond them to the source of the deadliest drugs. We want to stop the cultivation of coca, opium, poppy, and marijuana in South America before these poisons get to America. Drug traffickers that get through our borders must be apprehended by well-funded law enforcement.

Kids have to be taught that drugs will cutoff their dreams faster than any other mistake they could make. In many cases, just one hit of crack, meth, or pure heroin will end a child's future. It happens more often than we are willing to admit.

Just a couple of weeks ago, I had visited a nursing home in my community, and visited a young man who, at one time, was a captain of a football team. He got involved in drugs, and now he spends his life in the nursing home, hopeless. He will never have a family, will never have a job, will never be a responsible citizen. We need to stop those types of things. So, we have no choice. If we're to be moral leaders, we must vigorously attack all facets of the drug trade and we must aim to win.

Today we will hear from these three fine public servants who battle drug-traffickers every day. I want to know what resources you all really need in order to win this thing once and for all, because I'm convinced that with courage, persistence, resources, and accountability we can win.

I would now like to turn to my good friend, Congressman Tom Barrett of Wisconsin, for his opening statement.

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to join you in welcoming our distinguished panel of witnesses today. I had the pleasure of meeting General Wilhelm last Friday at Fort Benning, while a group of the subcommittee visited the U.S. Army School of the Americas.

I continue to have serious concerns about the school, but I'd like to take this opportunity to thank you, General, along with General Ernst, Colonel Trumble, and others associated with the School of the Americas for a very instructive visit. Regardless of the differences that we in Congress may have on the subject, it is clear that the members of our armed forces involved with program perform their job with professionalism. I want to thank you again for your hospitality while we were down there.

I'd also like to thank all the members of our panel for appearing here today. I am, particularly, interested in discussing emerging transit illegal drug production and trafficking in the Western Hemisphere. We have seen in the last year a 27 percent decrease

in coca cultivation in Peru and a 5 percent decrease in Bolivia. But, like a balloon squeezed at one end, cultivation appears to have increased 18 percent in Colombia.

The same appears to be true in the movement of drugs in transit to the United States. Though we appear to have been temporarily successful in the coverage of routes to the Caribbean, we see increasing movement through Puerto Rico. We also see increased movement in the Eastern Pacific to Mexico, and, ultimately, to our communities at home.

Similarly, in the activities of drug-trafficking organizations, we have witnessed the success of the Colombian National Police against the Cali Cartel, but we have seen adaptive changes in Colombian criminal organizations, and the increasing importance of Mexican traffickers. I am interested to hear your thoughts on these, and other trends, and what you think that we, in Congress, can do to help you succeed.

Finally, I would just like to make the observation, that it is important that this subcommittee continues to explore ways that we can better stem the sources of supply and interdict drugs before they reach our borders. It is just as important, however, that we look at the other major goals of the National Drug Control Strategy to educate and enable young people to reject illegal drugs and tobacco, to reduce drug-related crime and violence, and to reduce the health and social costs of illegal drug use.

I look forward to working with the chairman and other members of this subcommittee to explore these important goals which merit our time and attention.

Thank you very much.

Mr. HASTERT. Thank you.

At this time I'd like to welcome our witnesses and we're privileged to have Admiral Robert Kramek, Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Interdiction Coordinator. We also have General Charles Wilhelm, Commander-in-Chief, the U.S. Southern Command. And, we are also pleased to have Mr. Donnie Marshall, Acting Deputy Director of the Drug Enforcement Administration here today. I thank all of you gentlemen for being here.

As a rule of this subcommittee, we swear in all of our witnesses and I'd ask that you all please stand and raise your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. HASTERT. Let the record show that the witnesses answered in the affirmative.

Before our witnesses deliver their opening statements, I ask that a written statement prepared by the GAO be entered into the record. This statement for the record prepared by Ben Nelson, Director of the International Relations and Trade Issues is titled, "Status of U.S. International Counternarcotics Activities." The information is reported, primarily, from the GAO's February 1997, report entitled, "Drug Control: Longstanding Problems Hinder U.S. International Efforts," which was initiated at the request of this subcommittee.

Without objection, so ordered.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Nelson follows:]

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

We are pleased to be able to provide this statement for the record which summarizes our observations on the effectiveness of U.S. efforts to combat drug production and the movement of drugs into the United States. Specifically, this statement discusses (1) the challenges of addressing international counternarcotics issues, (2) obstacles to implementation of U.S. drug control efforts, and (3) areas requiring attention to improve the operational effectiveness of U.S. drug control efforts. The information in this statement is based primarily on our February 1997 report entitled Drug Control: Long-Standing Problems Hinder U.S. International Efforts, which was initiated at the request of this Subcommittee.[1] (See also the list of related GAO products at the end of this statement.)

SUMMARY

Despite long-standing efforts and expenditures of billions of dollars, illegal drugs still flood the United States. Although U.S. counternarcotics efforts have resulted in the arrest of major drug traffickers, the seizure of large amounts of drugs, and the eradication of illicit drug crops, they have not materially reduced the availability of drugs in the United States.

The United States and drug-producing and -transiting nations face a number of obstacles in attempting to reduce the production of and trafficking in illegal drugs. International drug-trafficking organizations are sophisticated, multibillion-dollar industries that quickly adapt to new U.S. drug control efforts. As success is achieved in one area, the drug-trafficking organizations change tactics, thwarting U.S. efforts.

There are also other obstacles that impede U.S. and drug-producing and -transiting countries' drug control efforts. In the drug-producing and -transiting countries, counternarcotics efforts are constrained by corruption, competing economic and political policies, inadequate laws, limited resources and institutional capabilities, and internal problems such as terrorism and civil unrest. Moreover, drug traffickers are increasingly resourceful in corrupting the countries' institutions.

For its part, the United States has not been able to maintain a well-organized and consistently funded international counternarcotics program. U.S. efforts have also been hampered by competing U.S. foreign policy objectives, organizational and operational limitations, and the lack of clear goals and objectives.

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[1] Drug Control: Long-Standing Problems Hinder U.S. International Efforts (GAO/NSIAD-97-75, Feb. 27, 1997).

Since our February 1997 report, some countries, with U.S. assistance, have taken steps to improve their capacity to reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. Among other things, these countries have taken action to extradite drug criminals; enacted legislation to control organized crime, money laundering, and chemicals used in the production of illicit drugs; and instituted reforms to reduce corruption. While these actions represent positive steps, it is too early to determine their impact, and challenges remain.

There is no panacea for resolving all of the problems associated with illegal drug trafficking, but based on our work over the past 10 years, we believe U.S. efforts could be better organized and that implementation can be improved. Thus, we recommended in our February 1997 report that the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) develop a multiyear plan that includes performance measures and long-term funding needs linked to the goals and objectives of the international drug control strategy.[2] We believe such a plan describing where, when, and how U.S. agencies intend to apply resources would provide a framework for the overall U.S. effort. In February 1998, ONDCP issued its 1998 National Drug Control Strategy and specific performance measures linked to the strategy. We are encouraged by ONDCP's latest effort to outline specific performance measures to assess the effectiveness of its strategy.

BACKGROUND

Illegal drug use, particularly of cocaine and heroin, continues to be a serious health problem in the United States. Under the National Drug Control Strategy, the United States has established domestic and international efforts to reduce the supply and demand for illegal drugs. Over the past 10 years, the United States has spent over $19 billion on international drug control and interdiction efforts to reduce the supply of illegal drugs.

The United States has developed a multifaceted drug control strategy intended to reduce the supply and demand for illegal drugs. The 1998 National Drug Control Strategy includes five goals: (1) educate and enable America's youth to reject illegal drugs as well as alcohol and tobacco; (2) increase the safety of U.S. citizens by substantially lowering drug-related crime and violence; (3) reduce health and social costs to the public of illegal drug use; (4) shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat; and (5) break foreign and domestic drug supply sources. The last two goals are the primary emphasis of U.S. international drug control and interdiction efforts. These are aimed at assisting the source and transiting nations[3] in their efforts to reduce drug cultivation and

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[2]Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-97-75, Feb. 27, 1997).

[3]The major source countries for coca and cocaine are Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. The major source nations for opium are Burma, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Laos, Colombia, and Mexico. The major drug transit areas include Mexico, the eastern Pacific, the Caribbean,

trafficking, improve their capabilities and coordination, promote the development of policies and laws, support research and technology, and conduct other related initiatives.

Section 490 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 requires the President to annually certify which drug-producing and -transiting countries are cooperating fully with the United States or taking adequate steps on their own to achieve full compliance with the goals and objectives established by the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances during the previous year.[4] On February 26, 1998, the President issued his certification in which 22 countries were certified; four were certified with a national interest waiver (Cambodia, Colombia, Pakistan and Paraguay); and four were denied certification or "decertified" (Afghanistan, Burma, Iran and Nigeria).

ONDCP is responsible for producing the National Drug Control Strategy and coordinating its implementation with other federal agencies. ONDCP has authority to review various agencies' funding levels to ensure they are sufficient to meet the goals of the national strategy but it has no direct control over how these resources are used. The Departments of State and Defense and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) are the principle agencies involved in implementing the international portion of the drug control strategy. Other U.S. agencies involved in counternarcotics activities overseas include the U.S. Agency for International Development, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Customs Service, various U.S. intelligence organizations, and other U.S. agencies.

ILLEGAL DRUGS REMAIN READILY AVAILABLE

Over the past 10 years, the U.S. agencies involved in counternarcotics efforts have attempted to reduce the supply and availability of illegal drugs in the United States through the implementation of the National Drug Control Strategy. Although they have achieved some successes, the cultivation of drug crops has not been reduced significantly, and cocaine, heroin, and other illegal drugs remain readily available in the United States. According to a July 1997 report of the National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee,[5] cocaine and heroin were readily available in all major U.S. metropolitan areas during 1996. The report also states that methamphetamine trafficking and abuse in the United States have been increasing during the past few years.

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and the nations of Central America.

[4]Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2291j).

[5]The National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee is a multiagency U.S. government panel that was established in 1978 to coordinate foreign and domestic collection, analysis, dissemination, and evaluation of drug-related intelligence.

Despite long-term efforts by the United States and many drug-producing countries to reduce drug cultivation and eradicate illegal crops, the total net cultivation of coca leaf and opium poppy has actually increased. While the areas under cultivation have changed from year to year, farmers have planted new coca faster than existing crops have been eradicated. For example, while the amount of coca under cultivation in the primary growing area of Colombia was reduced by 9,600 hectares[6] between 1996 and 1997, cultivation in two other Colombian growing areas increased by 21,900 hectares during this period. Overall, there has been very little change in the net area under coca cultivation since 1988. At the same time, the amount of opium poppy under cultivation increased by over 59,000 hectares, or by more than 30 percent between 1988 and 1997.

The amount of cocaine and heroin seized between 1990 and 1996 made little impact on the availability of illegal drugs in the United States and on the amount needed to satisfy the estimated U.S. demand. The July 1997 report by the National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee estimates potential cocaine production at about 760 metric tons for 1996, of which about 200 metric tons were seized worldwide. The remaining amount was more than enough to meet U.S. demand, which is estimated at about 300 metric tons per year.

DRUG-TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS HAVE SUBSTANTIAL RESOURCES, CAPABILITIES, AND OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY

A primary reason that U.S. and foreign governments' counternarcotics efforts are constrained is the growing power, influence, adaptability, and capabilities of drug-trafficking organizations. Because of their enormous financial resources, power to corrupt counternarcotics personnel, and operational flexibility, drug-trafficking organizations are a formidable threat. Despite some short-term achievements by U.S. and foreign government law enforcement agencies in disrupting the flow of illegal drugs into the United States, drug-trafficking organizations have found ways to continue to meet and exceed the demand of U.S. drug consumers.

According to U.S. agencies, drug-traffickers' organizations use their vast wealth to acquire and make use of expensive modern technology such as global positioning systems and cellular communications equipment. They use this technology to communicate and to coordinate transportation as well as to monitor and report on the activities of government organizations involved in counterdrug activities. In some countries, the complexity and sophistication of their equipment exceed the capabilities of the foreign governments trying to stop them. For example, we reported in October 1997 that many Caribbean

[6]One hectare equals 2.47 acres.

countries continue to be hampered by inadequate counternarcotics capabilities and have insufficient resources for conducting law enforcement activities in their coastal waters.[7]

When confronted with threats to their activities, drug-trafficking organizations use a variety of techniques to quickly change their modes of operation, thus avoiding capture of their personnel and seizure of their illegal drugs. For example, when air interdiction efforts have proven successful, traffickers have increased their use of maritime and overland transportation routes.[8] According to recent U.S. government reports, even after the capturing or killing of several drug cartel leaders in Colombia and Mexico, other leaders or organizations soon filled the void and adjusted their areas of operations. For example, we reported in February 1998 that, although the Colombian government had disrupted the activities of two major drug-trafficking organizations, the disruption had not reduced drug-trafficking activities and a new generation of relatively young traffickers was emerging.[9]

OBSTACLES IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES IMPEDE U.S. DRUG CONTROL EFFORTS

The United States is largely dependent on the countries that are the source of drug production and are transiting points for trafficking-related activities to reduce the amount of coca and opium poppy being cultivated and to make the drug seizures, arrests, and prosecutions necessary to stop the production and movement of illegal drugs. While the United States can provide assistance and support for drug control efforts in these countries, the success of those efforts depends on the countries' willingness and ability to combat the drug trade within their borders.

Like the United States, source and transiting countries face long-standing obstacles that limit the effectiveness of their drug control efforts. These obstacles, many of which are interrelated, are competing economic, political, and cultural problems, including terrorism and internal unrest; corruption; and inadequate law enforcement resources and institutional capabilities. The extent to which the United States can affect many of these obstacles is minimal.

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[7]Drug Control: Update on U.S. Interdiction Efforts in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific (GAO/NSIAD-98-30, Oct. 15, 1997).

[8]Drug Control: Revised Drug Interdiction Approach Is Needed in Mexico (GAO/NSIAD-93-152, May 10, 1993).

[9]Drug Control: U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts in Colombia Face Continuing Challenges (GAO/NSIAD-98-60, Feb. 12, 1998).

Drug Control Competes With Other Economic, Political, and Cultural Problems

The governments involved in drug eradication and control have other problems that compete for limited resources. As we reported over the years, drug-producing countries' efforts to curtail drug cultivation were constrained by political, economic, and/or cultural problems that far exceeded counternarcotics program managers' abilities to resolve. For example, these countries often had ineffective central government control over drug cultivation areas, competing demands for scarce host nation resources, weak economies that enhanced financial incentives for drug cultivation, corrupt or intimidated law enforcement and judicial officials, and legal cultivation of drug crops and traditional use of drugs.[10]

Internal strife in the source countries is another problem that competes for resources. Two primary source countries--Peru and Colombia--have had to allocate scarce funds to support military and other internal defense operations to combat guerrilla groups, which negatively affects counternarcotics operations. We reported that in Peru, for example, terrorist activities had hampered antidrug efforts.[11] The December 1996 hostage situation at the Japanese Ambassador's residence in Lima is an example of the Peruvian government's having to divert antidrug resources to confront a terrorist threat. Although some key guerrilla leaders in Peru and Colombia have been captured, terrorist groups will continue to hinder efforts to reduce coca cultivation and efforts to reduce its dependence on coca as a contributor to the economy. In 1991, 1993, and 1998, we reported similar problems in Colombia, where several guerrilla groups made it difficult to conduct effective antidrug operations in many areas of the country.[12] Colombia has also encountered resistance from farmers when it has tried to eradicate their coca crops.

Corruption Permeates Institutions in Countries Involved in Drug Production and Movement

Narcotics-related corruption is a long-standing problem impacting U.S. and foreign governments' efforts to reduce drug-trafficking activities. Our work has identified widespread corruption in Burma, Pakistan, Thailand, Mexico, Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, and

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[10]Controlling Drug Abuse: A Status Report (GAO/GGD-88-39, Mar. 1, 1988).

[11]The Drug War: U.S. Programs in Peru Face Serious Obstacles (GAO/NSIAD-92-36, Oct. 21, 1991) and The Drug War: Observations on Counternarcotics Programs in Colombia and Peru (GAO/T-NSIAD-92-2, Oct. 23, 1991).

[12]The Drug War: Counternarcotics Programs in Colombia and Peru (GAO/T-NSIAD-92-9, Feb. 20, 1992), The Drug War: Colombia Is Implementing Antidrug Efforts, but Impact Is Uncertain (GAO/T-NSIAD-94-53, Oct. 5, 1993) and Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-98-60, Feb. 12, 1998).

the countries of Central America and the Caribbean–among the countries most significantly involved in the cultivation, production, and transit of illicit narcotics.[13]

Corruption remains a serious, widespread problem in Colombia and Mexico, the two countries most significantly involved in producing and shipping cocaine.[14] According to the U.S. Ambassador to Colombia, corruption in Colombia is the most significant impediment to a successful counternarcotics effort. The State Department also reported that persistent corruption within Mexico continued to undermine both police and law enforcement operations. Many law enforcement officers have been arrested and dismissed due to corruption. The most noteworthy was the February 1997 arrest of General José Gutierrez Rebollo–former head of the Mexican equivalent of DEA. He was charged with drug trafficking, organized crime and bribery, illicit enrichment, and association with one of the leading drug-trafficking organizations in Mexico. In February 1998, the U.S. embassy reported that three Mexican law enforcement officials who had successfully passed screening procedures were arrested for stealing seized cocaine–illustrating that corruption continues despite measures designed to root it out. The government of Mexico acknowledges that narcotics-related corruption is pervasive and entrenched within the criminal justice system and has placed drug-related corruption in the forefront of its national priorities.

Inadequate Resources and Institutional Capabilities Limit Arrests and Convictions of Drug Traffickers

Effective law enforcement operations and adequate judicial and legislative tools are key to the success of efforts to stop the flow of drugs from the source and transiting countries. Although the United States can provide assistance, these countries must seize the illegal drugs and arrest, prosecute, and extradite the traffickers, when possible, in order to stop the production and movement of drugs internationally. However, as we have reported on several occasions, these countries lack the resources and capabilities necessary to stop drug-trafficking activities within their borders.

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[13]Drug Control: U.S.-Supported Efforts in Burma, Pakistan, and Thailand (GAO/NSIAD-88-94, Feb. 26, 1988); The Drug War (GAO/T-NSIAD-92-2, Oct. 23, 1991); The Drug War: Colombia Is Undertaking Antidrug Programs, but Impact Is Uncertain (GAO/NSIAD-93-158, Aug. 10, 1993), The Drug War (GAO/T-NSIAD-94-53, Oct. 5, 1993); Drug Control: Interdiction Efforts in Central America Have Had Little Impact on the Flow of Drugs (GAO/NSIAD-94-233, Aug. 2, 1994); Drug Control: U.S. Interdiction Efforts in the Caribbean Decline (GAO/NSIAD-96-119, Apr. 17, 1996) and Drug Control: Counternarcotics Efforts in Mexico (GAO/NSIAD-96-163, June 12, 1996).

[14]Drug War: Observations on the U.S. International Drug Control Strategy (GAO/T-NSIAD-95-182, June 27, 1995) and Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-96-163, June 12, 1996).

In 1991, we reported that the lack of resources and adequately trained police personnel hindered Panama's ability to address drug-trafficking and money-laundering activities.[15] Also, in 1994, we reported that Central American countries did not have the resources or institutional capability to combat drug trafficking and depended heavily on U.S. counternarcotics assistance.[16] In June 1996, we reported that equipment shortcomings and inadequately trained personnel limited the government of Mexico's ability to detect and interdict drugs and drug traffickers, as well as to aerially eradicate drug crops.[17] Our more recent work in Mexico indicates that these problems persist. For example, in 1997 the U.S. embassy reported that the 73 UH-1H helicopters provided by the United States to the Mexican military for eradication and reconnaissance purposes were of little utility above 5,000 feet, where most of the opium poppy is cultivated. Furthermore, the Bilateral Border Task Forces, which were established to investigate and dismantle the most significant drug-trafficking organizations along the U.S.-Mexico border, face operational and support problems, including inadequate Mexican government funding for equipment, fuel and salary supplements for personnel assigned to the units.

OTHER OBSTACLES INHIBIT SUCCESS IN FULFILLING U.S. INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY

Our work over the past 10 years has identified other obstacles to implementing the U.S. international drug control strategy: (1) competing U.S. foreign policy objectives, (2) organizational and operational limitations among and within the U.S. agencies involved, and (3) inconsistent U.S. funding levels.

U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives Compete for Attention and Resources

In carrying out its foreign policy, the United States seeks to promote U.S. business and trade, improve human rights, and support democracy, as well as to reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. These objectives compete for attention and resources, and U.S. officials must make tough choices about which to pursue more vigorously. As a result of U.S. policy decisions, counternarcotics issues have often received less attention than other objectives. According to an August 1996 Congressional

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[15]The War on Drugs: Narcotics Control Efforts in Panama (GAO/NSIAD-91-233, June 16, 1991).

[16]Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-94-233, Aug. 2, 1994).

[17]Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-96-163, June 12, 1996).

Research Service report, inherent contradictions regularly appear between U.S. counternarcotics policy and other policy goals and concerns.[18]

Our work has shown the difficulties in balancing counternarcotics and other U.S. foreign policy objectives. For example, in 1990 we reported that the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the U.S. Agency for International Development disagreed over providing assistance to Bolivia for the growth of soybeans as an alternative to coca plants.[19] The Agriculture Department feared that such assistance would interfere with U.S. trade objectives by developing a potential competitor for U.S. exports of soybeans. In 1995, we reported that countering the drug trade was the fourth highest priority of the U.S embassy in Mexico.[20] During our May 1995 visit to Mexico, the U.S. Ambassador told us that he had focused his attention during the prior 18 months on higher priority issues of trade and commerce such as the North American Free Trade Agreement and the U.S. financial support program for the Mexican peso. In 1996, the embassy elevated counternarcotics to an equal priority with the promotion of U.S. business and trade as the top priorities of the embassy, and it still remains that way.[21]

In addition, resources allocated for counternarcotics efforts are sometimes shifted to satisfy other policy objectives. For example, as we reported in 1995, $45 million originally intended for counternarcotics assistance for cocaine source countries was reprogrammed by the Department of State to assist Haiti's democratic transition.[22] The funds were used to pay for such items as the cost of non-U.S. personnel assigned to the multinational force, training of a police force, and development of a job creation and feeding program. A similar diversion occurred in the early 1990s when U.S. Coast Guard assets in the Caribbean were reallocated from counternarcotics missions to the humanitarian mission of aiding emigrants in their mass exodus from Cuba and Haiti.

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[18]International Drug Trade and Its Impact on the United States, Congressional Research Service, 96-671F, August 9, 1996.

[19]Restrictions on U.S. Aid to Bolivia for Crop Development Is Competing With U.S. Agricultural Exports and Their Relationship to U.S. Anti-Drug Efforts (GAO/T-NSIAD-90-52, June 27, 1990).

[20]Drug War (GAO/T-NSIAD-95-182, June 27, 1995).

[21]Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-96-163, June 12, 1996).

[22]Drug War: Observations on U.S. International Drug Control Efforts (GAO/T-NSIAD-95-194, Aug. 1, 1995).

The United States terminated most of its efforts to address opium cultivation in Burma, the world's largest opium producer, because of its human rights policies and the failure of the Burmese government to recognize the democratically elected government.[23]

Organizational and Operational Limitations Hamper Drug Control Efforts

The United States faces several organizational and operational challenges that limit its ability to implement effective antidrug efforts. Many of these challenges are long-standing problems. Several of our reports have identified problems involving competing priorities, interagency rivalries, lack of operational coordination, inadequate staffing of joint interagency task forces, and lack of oversight.

For example, our 1995 work in Colombia indicated that there was confusion among U.S. embassy officials about the role of the offices involved in intelligence analysis and related operational plans for interdiction.[24] In 1996, we reported that several agencies, including the U.S. Customs Service, DEA, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, had not provided personnel, as they had agreed, to the Joint Interagency Task Force in Key West because of budgetary constraints.[25] With the exception of a few positions that have been filled at the Task Force since then, staffing shortfalls continued to exist when we reported in October 1997.[26]

Furthermore, we have reported that in some cases, the United States did not adequately control the use of U.S. counternarcotics assistance and was unable to ensure that it was used as intended. Despite legislative requirements mandating controls over U.S.-provided assistance, we found instances of inadequate oversight of counternarcotics funds. For example, between 1991 and 1994, we issued four reports in which we concluded that U.S. officials lacked sufficient oversight of aid to ensure that it was being used effectively and as intended in Peru and Colombia.[27] We also reported that the government of Mexico had

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[23]Drug Control: U.S. Heroin Program Encounters Many Obstacles in Southeast Asia (GAO/NSIAD-96-83, Mar. 1, 1996).

[24]Drug War (GAO/T-NSIAD-95-182, June 27, 1995)

[25]Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-96-119, Apr. 17, 1996).

[26]Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-98-30, Oct. 15, 1997).

[27]Drug War: Observations on Counternarcotics Aid to Colombia (GAO/NSIAD-91-296 Sept. 30, 1991); The Drug War (GAO/NSIAD-92-36, Oct. 21, 1991) The Drug War (GAO/T-NSIAD-92-2, Oct. 23, 1991); and The Drug War (GAO/T-NSIAD-94-53, Oct. 5, 1993)

misused U.S.-provided counternarcotics helicopters to transport Mexican military personnel during the 1994 uprising in the Mexican state of Chiapas.[28]

Our recent work in Mexico indicates that oversight and accountability of counternarcotics assistance continues to be a problem. We found that embassy records on UH-1H helicopter usage for the civilian law enforcement agencies were incomplete. Additionally, we found that the U.S. military's ability to provide adequate oversight is limited by the end-use monitoring agreement signed by the governments of the United States and Mexico.
We also found instances where lessons learned from past counternarcotics efforts were not known to current planners and operators, both internally in an agency and within the U.S. antidrug community. For example the United States initiated an operation to support Colombia and Peru in their efforts to curtail the air movement of coca products between the two countries. However, U S Southern Command personnel stated that while they were generally aware of the previous operation, they were neither aware of the problems that had been encountered, nor of the solutions developed in the early 1990s when planning the current operation. U.S. Southern Command officials attributed this problem to the continual turnover of personnel and the requirement to destroy most classified documents and reports after 5 years. These officials stated that an after-action reporting system for counternarcotics activities is now in place at the U.S. Southern Command.

Funding Levels Have Complicated Drug Control Efforts

From 1988 to 1997, the United States spent about $110 billion on domestic and international efforts to reduce the use and availability of illegal drugs in the United States. Of this amount, over $19 billion was expended on international counternarcotics efforts supporting (1) the eradication of drug crops, the development of alternative forms of income for drug crop farmers, and increased foreign law enforcement capabilities ($4.2 billion); and (2) interdiction activities ($15.3 billion). However, from year to year, funding for international counternarcotics efforts has fluctuated and until recently had declined. In some instances, because of budgetary constraints, Congress did not appropriate the level of funding agencies requested; in others, the agencies applied funding erratically, depending on other priorities. The reduction in funding has sometimes made it difficult to carry out U.S. operations and has also hampered source and transiting countries' operations.

For fiscal year 1998, the funding levels for counternarcotics activities were increased. For example, the State Department's international narcotics control and law enforcement programs were fully funded for fiscal year 1998 at $210 million. However, without longer-

[28]Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-96-163, June 12, 1996).

term budget stability, it may be difficult for agencies to plan and implement programs that they believe will reduce drug production and drug trafficking.

NEED FOR LONG-TERM PLANS THAT INCLUDE MEASURABLE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

There is no easy remedy for overcoming all of the obstacles posed by drug-trafficking activities. International drug control efforts aimed at stopping the production of illegal drugs and drug-related activities in the source and transiting countries are only one element of an overall national drug control strategy. Alone, these efforts will not likely solve the U.S. drug problem. Overcoming many of the long-standing obstacles to reducing the supply and smuggling of illegal drugs requires a long-term commitment. In our February 1997 report, we pointed out that the United States can improve the effectiveness of planning and implementing its current international drug control efforts by developing a multiyear plan with measurable goals and objectives and a multiyear funding plan.[29]

We have been reporting since 1988 that U.S. counternarcotics efforts have been hampered by the absence of a long-term plan outlining each agency's commitment to achieving the goals and objectives of the international drug control strategy. We pointed out that judging U.S. agencies' performance in reducing the supply of and interdicting illegal drugs is difficult because the agencies have not established meaningful measures to evaluate their contribution to achieving these goals. Also, agencies have not devised multiyear funding plans that could serve as a more consistent basis for policymakers and program managers to determine requirements for effectively implementing a plan and determining the best use of resources.

We have issued numerous reports citing the need for an overall implementation plan with specific goals and objectives and performance measures linked to them. In 1988, we reported that goals and objectives had not been established in the drug-producing countries examined and, in 1993, we recommended that ONDCP develop performance measures to evaluate agencies' drug control efforts and incorporate the measures in the national drug control strategy.[30] Under the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (P.L. 103-62), federal agencies are required to develop strategic plans covering at least 5 years, with results-oriented performance measures.

In February 1998, ONDCP issued its annual National Drug Control Strategy. The strategy contains various performance measures to assess the strategy's effectiveness. In March 1998, ONDCP issued more specific and comprehensive performance measures for this

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[29]Drug Control (GAO/NSIAD-97-75, Feb. 27, 1997).

[30]Drug Control: U.S. International Narcotics Control Activities (GAO/NSIAD-88-114, Mar. 1, 1988) and Drug Control: Reauthorization of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (GAO/GGD-93-144, Sept. 29, 1993).

strategy. In the near future, ONDCP plans to publish a classified annex to the strategy which, according to ONDCP officials, will be regional and, in some instances, country specific, and will be results oriented. While we have not reviewed the 1998 Strategy and its related performance measures in detail, we believe this parallels the recommendations we have made over the years to develop a long-term plan with meaningful performance measures. Additionally, the United States and Mexico issued a bi-national drug strategy in February 1998, but it did not contain critical performance measures and milestones for assessing performance. ONDCP officials told us that they plan to issue comprehensive performance measures for the bi-national strategy by the end of the year.

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Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this concludes our statement for the record. Thank you for permitting us to provide you with this information.

RELATED GAO PRODUCTS

Drug Control: Counternarcotics Efforts in Colombia Face Continuing Challenges (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-103, Feb. 26, 1998).

Drug Control: U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts in Colombia Face Continuing Challenges (GAO/NSIAD-98-60, Feb. 12, 1998).

Drug Control: Planned Actions Should Clarify Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center's Impact (GAO/GGD-98-28, Feb. 3, 1998)

Drug Control: Update on U.S. Interdiction Efforts in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific (GAO/NSIAD-98-30, Oct. 15, 1997)

Drug Control: Delays in Obtaining State Department Records Relating to Colombia (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-202, July 9, 1997).

Drug Control: Reauthorization of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (GAO/T-GGD-97-97, May 1, 1997).

Drug Control: Observations on Elements of the Federal Drug Control Strategy (GAO/GGD-97-42, Mar. 14, 1997).

Drug Control: Long-standing Problems Hinder U.S. International Efforts (GAO/NSIAD-97-75, Feb. 27, 1997).

Customs Service: Drug Interdiction Efforts (GAO/GGD-96-189BR, Sept. 26, 1996)

Drug Control: U.S. Heroin Control Efforts in Southeast Asia (GAO/T-NSIAD-96-240, Sept. 19, 1996).

Drug Control: Observations on Counternarcotics Activities in Mexico (GAO/T-NSIAD-96-239, Sept. 12, 1996).

Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Technologies for Detecting Explosives and Narcotics (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-252, Sept. 4, 1996).

Drug Control: Counternarcotics Efforts in Mexico (GAO/NSIAD-96-163, June 12, 1996).

Drug Control: Observations on Counternarcotics Efforts in Mexico (GAO/T-NSIAD-96-182, June 12, 1996).

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Drug Control: U.S. Interdiction Efforts in the Caribbean Decline (GAO/NSIAD-96-119, Apr. 17, 1996).

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Drug Control: U.S. Heroin Program Encounters Many Obstacles in Southeast Asia (GAO/NSIAD-96-83, Mar. 1, 1996).

Review of Assistance to Colombia (GAO/NSIAD-96-62R, Dec. 12, 1995)

Drug War: Observations on U.S. International Drug Control Efforts (GAO/T-NSIAD-95-194, Aug. 1, 1995).

Drug War: Observations on the U.S. International Drug Control Strategy (GAO/T-NSIAD-95-182, June 27, 1995).

Honduras: Continuing U.S. Military Presence at Soto Cano Base Is Not Critical (GAO/NSIAD-95-39, Feb. 8, 1995).

Drug Activity in Haiti (GAO/OSI-95-6R, Dec 28, 1994).

Drug Control: U.S. Antidrug Efforts in Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley (GAO/NSIAD-95-11, Dec. 7, 1994).

Drug Control: U.S. Drug Interdiction Issues in Latin America (GAO/T-NSIAD-95-32, Oct. 7, 1994).

Drug Control in Peru (GAO/NSIAD-94-186BR, Aug. 16, 1994).

Drug Control: Interdiction Efforts in Central America Have Had Little Impact on the Flow of Drugs (GAO/NSIAD-94-233, Aug. 2, 1994).

Drug Control: U.S. Counterdrug Activities in Central America (GAO/T-NSIAD-94-251, Aug. 2, 1994).

Illicit Drugs: Recent Efforts to Control Chemical Diversion and Money Laundering (GAO/NSIAD-94-34, Dec. 8, 1993).

Drug Control: The Office of National Drug Control Policy-Strategies Need Performance Measures (GAO/T-GGD-94-49, Nov. 15, 1993).

Drug Control: Expanded Military Surveillance Not Justified by Measurable Goals (GAO/T-NSIAD-94-14, Oct. 5, 1993).

The Drug War: Colombia Is Implementing Antidrug Efforts, but Impact Is Uncertain (GAO/T-NSIAD-94-53, Oct. 5, 1993).

Drug Control: Reauthorization of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (GAO/GGD-93-144, Sept. 29, 1993).

Drug Control: Heavy Investment in Military Surveillance Is Not Paying Off (GAO/NSIAD-93-220, Sept. 1, 1993).

The Drug War: Colombia Is Undertaking Antidrug Programs, but Impact Is Uncertain (GAO/NSIAD-93-158, Aug. 10, 1993).

Drugs: International Efforts to Attack a Global Problem (GAO/NSIAD-93-165, June 23, 1993).

Drug Control: Revised Drug Interdiction Approach Is Needed in Mexico (GAO/NSIAD-93-152, May 10, 1993).

Drug Control: Coordination of Intelligence Activities (GAO/GGD-93-83BR, Apr. 2, 1993).

Drug Control: Increased Interdiction and its Contribution to the War on Drugs (GAO/T-NSIAD-93-04, Feb. 25, 1993)

Drug War: Drug Enforcement Administration's Staffing and Reporting in Southeast Asia (GAO/NSIAD-93-82, Dec. 4, 1992).

The Drug War: Extent of Problems in Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela (GAO/NSIAD-92-226, June 5, 1992).

Drug Control: Inadequate Guidance Results in Duplicate Intelligence Production Efforts (GAO/NSIAD-92-153, Apr. 14, 1992).

The Drug War: Counternarcotics Programs in Colombia and Peru (GAO/T-NSIAD-92-9, Feb. 20, 1992).

Drug Policy and Agriculture: U.S. Trade Impacts of Alternative Crops to Andean Coca (GAO/NSIAD-92-12, Oct. 28, 1991).

The Drug War: Observations on Counternarcotics Programs in Colombia and Peru (GAO/T-NSIAD-92-2, Oct. 23, 1991).

The Drug War: U.S. Programs in Peru Face Serious Obstacles (GAO/NSIAD-92-36, Oct. 21, 1991).

Drug War: Observations on Counternarcotics Aid to Colombia (GAO/NSIAD-91-296, Sept. 30, 1991).

Drug Control: Impact of DOD's Detection and Monitoring on Cocaine Flow (GAO/NSIAD-91-297, Sept. 19, 1991).

The War On Drugs: Narcotics Control Efforts in Panama (GAO/NSIAD-91-233, July 16, 1991).

Drug Interdiction: Funding Continues to Increase but Program Effectiveness Is Unknown (GAO/GGD-91-10, Dec. 11, 1990).

Restrictions on U.S. Aid to Bolivia for Crop Development Competing With U.S. Agricultural Exports and Their Relationship to U.S. Anti-Drug Efforts (GAO/T-NSIAD-90-52, June 27, 1990).

Drug Control: How Drug Consuming Nations Are Organized for the War on Drugs (GAO/NSIAD-90-133, June 4, 1990).

Drug Control: Anti-Drug Efforts in the Bahamas (GAO/GGD-90-42, Mar. 8, 1990).

Drug Control: Enforcement Efforts in Burma Are Not Effective (GAO/NSIAD-89-197, Sept. 11, 1989)

Drug Smuggling: Capabilities for Interdicting Airborne Private Aircraft Are Limited and Costly (GAO/GGD-89-93, June 9, 1989).

Drug Smuggling: Capabilities for Interdicting Airborne Drug Smugglers Are Limited and Costly (GAO/T-GGD-89-28, June 9, 1989).

Drug Control: U.S.-Supported Efforts in Colombia and Bolivia (GAO/NSIAD-89-24, Nov. 1, 1988).

Drug Control: U.S. International Narcotics Control Activities (GAO/NSIAD-88-114, Mar. 1, 1988).

Controlling Drug Abuse: A Status Report (GAO/GGD-88-39, Mar. 1, 1988).

Drug Control: U.S.-Supported Efforts in Burma, Pakistan, and Thailand (GAO/NSIAD-88-94, Feb. 26, 1988).

Drug Control: River Patrol Craft for the Government of Bolivia (GAO/NSIAD-88-101FS, Feb. 2, 1988).

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U.S.-Mexico Opium Poppy and Marijuana Aerial Eradication Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-87-42, Aug. 5, 1987).

Status Report on GAO Review of the U.S. International Narcotics Control Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-87-40, July 29, 1987).

Drug Control: International Narcotics Control Activities of the United States (GAO/NSIAD-87-72BR, Jan. 30, 1987).

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Mr. HASTERT. Admiral Kramek, would you please proceed with your statement.

STATEMENTS OF ADMIRAL ROBERT E. KRAMEK, U.S. INTERDICTION COORDINATOR; GENERAL CHARLES E. WILHELM, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND; AND DONNIE MARSHALL, ACTING DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Admiral KRAMEK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This is about the fourth time I've appeared before your committee in the last couple of years, and I want to thank you for your insight and support on what we do.

I'll testify, today, in my role as the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, a collateral duty given to me 4 years ago by the President. My duties are outlined in Presidential Decision Directive 14, but in summary, they are: to assess the threat of drugs coming to us through the Western Hemisphere, particularly, the transit zone; to make sure that forces there are organized and in a command and control plan, including General Wilhelm's forces, as well as, PACOM, ACOM, DEA, Customs, Coast Guard; that they're asking for sufficient resources in their budgets to meet the threat; and that the assets that they get are employed wisely. We do that every day and all day. We meet together frequently, once a quarter. We have a commander's conference with the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, called the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator/Joint Staff Conference. All of us meet together for 2 days, identify the major issues, and then I report to General McCaffrey, the head of ONDCP, who then reports to the President.

I'm also advised by a special committee, called the Interdiction Committee. It consists of the Commissioner of Customs, the Administrator of the DEA, the J–3 on the Joint Staff, INL on the State Department, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, and others. We meet frequently. We put a list of the 10 most important interdiction priorities together and forward that to General McCaffrey, also, and report to him on our progress on all those priorities.

We're convinced that we know the threat and how best to counter that threat. Through the last 4 or 5 years, we've put together a strong organization under the National Interdiction Command and Control Plan. It's got good C4I, command, control, communications, computers intelligence. We've improved INTEL to the extent that we now cue in intelligence for most of our operations, rather than just sailing on the seas, or flying in the air looking for targets of opportunity. In fact, over 80 percent of our operations are based on intelligence. They're well coordinated. We see improving regional cooperation. We now have 19 nations in the Caribbean that have signed maritime agreements with us to allow us to go into their airspace, their territorial seas, and to have shipriders on board.

Frontier Shield is an example of our success where we reduced the flow of cocaine. This committee was very concerned about that, and that 18 percent to 20 percent of all of cocaine reaching the United States had come through Puerto Rico. We reduced that fig-

ure to 5 percent this last year, and I'd be happy, during my testimony to show you what we had to do to accomplish that. I'm also happy to report that we've sustained that operation now with a sustaining force comprised of all of our services and all of the agencies around Puerto Rico. Huge investments by FBI, DEA, Customs, SOUTHCOM, Coast Guard, and others as well. The Peru-Colombia airbridge is a great success. I know that General Wilhelm will give you some details on that.

In perspective, interdiction, which I'm responsible for, comprises about 11 percent of the entire National Drug Control Strategy Budget, about 11 percent. It varies between 9 percent and 11 percent of the total for the last couple of years. I have just completed a 5-year transit zone asset plan for interdiction requirements. This is a work-in-progress that will be completing review over the next 2 weeks by the various agencies of Government. It'll then be forwarded to General McCaffrey for his consideration and inclusion in his strategy.

Again, I want to thank you for your support of our programs and our efforts. Your oversight is important and we appreciate all of the energy that you and members of the subcommittee have put into this.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Kramek follows:]

STATEMENT OF
ADMIRAL ROBERT E. KRAMEK
UNITED STATES INTERDICTION COORDINATOR
ON THE
REGIONAL EFFORTS TO FIGHT THE DRUG TRADE
BEFORE THE
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
AND OVERSIGHT
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to appear before this distinguished Committee today to address regional efforts in the source and transit zones against the drug trade. Before I begin, I would like to thank you for your continued strong support and interest in counterdrug activities, including interdiction.

As you know, my responsibilities as the U. S. Interdiction Coordinator include the non-operational, non-tactical oversight of United States' interdiction efforts in the Western Hemisphere up to but not including the borders of the United States. I endeavor to optimize the employment of U.S. aerial and maritime detection and monitoring and apprehension assets, as well as evaluate whether assets committed by departments and agencies to international interdiction are adequate to meet the goals of the National Drug Control Strategy. One of the tools I use to assess our efforts is a quarterly counterdrug conference I co-host with the J-3 at the Joint Staff. In it, I meet with the field operational commanders and principals of agencies and organizations involved in international interdiction in order to help provide a bridge between field operations and policy

development here in Washington. The conferences have been extremely beneficial in refining our collective understanding of the drug trafficking threats, optimizing our resources against the threat, creating a coordinating mechanism for new initiatives, and providing strategic guidance. This forum also provides me with valuable insights on the key issues to me as the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator.

It has been made clear to me at those conferences and through the improved Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement (IACM), or "flows" process, that we now have a much better understanding of the cocaine industry, the trafficker's modalities and transportation mechanisms used in both the source and transit zones. The operational commanders have a better understanding of the challenges presented by the traffickers than at any time before. We know how much cocaine is produced, where it is manufactured, and how it is moved through the source and transit zones.

Interagency interdiction coordination is at an all time high. The National Interdiction Command and Control Plan issued in April 1994, was at that time a landmark effort which consolidated interagency drug interdiction efforts into a more cohesive command and control structure. It provides for three Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs) and one Domestic Air Interdiction Coordination Center (DAICC). My staff led an interagency effort to update it in October 1997, creating an even more unified national counterdrug command and control structure that is aligned with the President's objectives expressed in Presidential Decision Directives (PDD's) 14 and 44 and the National Drug Control Strategy. We have clearly realized the intended force multiplier effects of

"national" task forces that are manned and led by personnel from all of the federal agencies with drug interdiction missions.

Our many successes in 1997 showcase this. Interagency and international cooperative efforts yielded record cocaine seizures in the transit zone. Congress and the National Drug Control Strategy asked us to do something about the drug trafficking problems around Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. and we did by implementing Operations GATEWAY and FRONTIER SHIELD. These operations very successfully denied the non-commercial air and maritime routes to this region. Expectedly, the traffickers responded to our interdiction efforts and have shifted maritime trafficking away from Puerto Rico to Hispaniola, the Bahamas, and the western Caribbean. This new threat to Hispaniola is being addressed through a new Coast Guard led interagency pulse operation titled FRONTIER LANCE.

Our successful Peru-Colombia airbridge interdiction program is a model of international cooperative effort, which the Secretary of State attributes as the cause of reductions in source country coca cultivation hectarage- 40 percent in Peru over the last two years. As a result of this interdiction pressure, the traffickers have shifted their methods to Colombia which has now surpassed Peru as the world's leading coca producer. There is interagency consensus that interdiction efforts should focus additionally on southeast Colombia.

The 1997 successes are due to the tremendous dedication of the men and women of each agency involved in international counterdrug activities and their determined efforts to optimally work together. They are also due to a renewed commitment by the Administration and Congress to provide the resources necessary to fight drug smuggling. Average interdiction funding for fiscal years 1997-1999 (proposed) is over $400 million, or 31 percent, higher than for fiscal years 1994-1996, despite increasing pressure to balance the budget.

The 1998 Caribbean program sustains the interdiction activity in the Operation FRONTIER SHIELD area of operations around Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. Pulse operations in the vicinity of Haiti and the Dominican Republic will be introduced as a prelude to Operation FRONTIER LANCE, and will serve as a proof of concept for law enforcement operations forward staged out of foreign bases with international partners. Both the Coast Guard and the Customs Service are making key technology investments in 1998, improving aircraft and vessel surveillance capabilities and equipping their personnel with more advanced drug detection systems.

The President's 1999 Budget contains a $190 million, or 12 percent, increase for drug interdiction programs over the 1998 enacted level. Included in the President's request is a $49 million Caribbean Violent Crime and Regional Interdiction Initiative, which will complete the outfitting of Coast Guard C-130 aircraft with modern sensors; enhance DEA field offices and foreign operations; and increase funding for DoD and Department of State Caribbean counterdrug activities.

Federal drug interdiction efforts are better coordinated and more efficient than they have ever been. As I indicated earlier, our intelligence and analysis efforts have yielded a much improved understanding of how and where the traffickers are doing business. New technology is making our surveillance aircraft up to 20 percent more productive and is allowing us to take back the night from the smugglers. Finally, interagency cooperation has made the placement and use of interdiction personnel and assets more cost-effective than in the past.

The 1997 Classified Annex to the National Drug Control Strategy, assigned me the task of developing a 5 year transit zone asset plan...an effort to take a longer range view of interdiction requirements. To do this, I assembled a group of interagency experts to develop it. It will represent a requirements document for U.S. interdiction efforts in the transit zone necessary to implement the National Strategy. I will soon deliver the proposed plan to General McCaffrey.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you and the other members of this distinguished committee for your support and guidance. I ask for your strong support of the President's 1999 interdiction program, which is such a crucial part of our National Drug Control Strategy.

Mr. HASTERT. Thank you, Admiral.

General Wilhelm please proceed with your opening statement.

General WILHELM. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this subcommittee, on behalf of all of the members of the interagency team at U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), thank you for this opportunity to appear before you and present my assessment of the challenges and opportunities that lie before us as we continue to prosecute the fight against illegal drugs and the damage that they do, not only to our society, but to all of the governments and all of the people in our hemisphere.

This past year has been one of significant growth and change for U.S. Southern Command. We have completed the relocation of our headquarters from Quarry Heights in Panama to Miami.

Our new command post places function over form. I believe that we have the most technologically advanced command and control capabilities of any regional combatant command. We can see clearly from Miami all the way to Tierra Del Fuego, and I want to thank all the members of this subcommittee who had a hand in making that possible for us.

This past summer, we assumed responsibility for the Caribbean region and its island nations. This change in the Unified Command Plan swell the number of countries in the Southern Command area of responsibility to 32. Of greater importance for our counter-drug activities, it united the source and transit zones under a single responsible commander. This change also altered both the geographic and the cultural content of our theater of operations.

Prior to the most recent Unified Command Plan changes, SOUTHCOM was primarily a land-locked theater. Now it has balanced, continental, maritime, and aerospace dimensions, and we are confronted with a challenge of efficiently and meaningfully integrating the English-speaking nations of the Eastern Caribbean with the Spanish-speaking countries of Central and South America.

In a great many ways, Southern Command is unique. We are not a major theater of war. The threats that confront us are not, in all cases, the same ones that confront the other regional combatant commands. And, our force and resource requirements are, therefore, quite different. For those reasons, I was pleased when I received my invitation to testify before this subcommittee and noted that this would be a focused hearing oriented toward the counter-drug fight, our national counter-drug strategy, and SOUTHCOM's need to execute that strategy.

In my written statement, I address in some detail not only drug-trafficking, but illegal migration, terrorism, and other trans-national threats in this hemisphere. While each of these threats provides justifiable cause for concern, the drug problem is far and away the most immediate and most stressing.

I would like to give you just a thumbnail assessment of where we are in our efforts to combat this declared threat to our national security and to the security instability of our entire hemisphere.

I mentioned earlier that Southern Command is not a major theater of war. Based on that statement, most folks would assume that we do not have to concern ourselves with threats like weapons of mass destruction. I would suggest that drugs are a weapon of mass destruction. In 1995 alone, they killed over 14,000 Americans. The

only difference is that drugs killed our kids and our other citizens one at time, instead of in large groups.

We are broadly engaged in support of the counterdrug fight. Whereas last year at this time, our efforts were focused almost exclusively on the source zone. This year we have joined the fight, in the demand, and the transit zones as well.

When we moved our headquarters to Miami, we took up residence in a designated High-Intensity Drug-Trafficking Area. Now our people drive through the drug problem on their way to work and our kids walk through on their way to school. For us, the drug problem has become more personal and it has taken on added urgency.

In the transit zone in cooperation with our neighbors and other agency players, we are attacking the flow of drugs on all four movement vectors through the Caribbean. Operations like Frontier Shield, which Bob mentioned, with Puerto Rico, and Frontier Lance, which is now underway with the Dominican Republic and Haiti, are making a difference. However, we are not making enough of a difference.

Last year, working with Admiral Kramek, Mr. Marshall, and the organizations they represent, and others, we seized roughly one-third of the cocaine that was destined for U.S. users. Impressive though this may sound, by our calculations, supply still exceeds demand. To address the imbalance, working with other interagency players, we are intensifing our efforts with the nations of the Andean Ridge. Through balanced programs of interdiction, eradication, and alternative development, we must reduce production. We are also working with the Department of Defense to identify additional assets that will enable us to execute Operation Caper Focus, which targets trafficking in the Eastern Pacific.

In the source zone, we have been encouraged by the progress made by Peru, and Ecuador, as mentioned by Congressman Barrett. In the past year alone, as he mentioned, Peru has reduced its production by 27 percent, and Bolivia has turned an important corner reducing its production by 5 percent. However, as mentioned, the situation in Colombia has deteriorated. With an 18 percent increase in production, Colombia has replaced Peru as the No. 1 cultivator of coca.

Of equal concern, is the steady growth of the Colombian poppy fields and the deadly heroin problem that they spawn. Last week, we received a sobering reminder of the gravity of the situation in Colombia. The heavy losses inflicted on the Colombian army near El Billar by the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) demonstrate clearly the impact of drug money and the power of the unholy alliance between the insurgents and the narcotraffickers.

We must make the most of the recent decision to grant Colombia a national interest waiver. I will visit our new Ambassador and the leaders of the Colombian Armed Forces next week to explore ways and means to assist the armed forces to improve their performance against the threat which has brought tragedy to the Colombian people and their country to a state of crisis.

To combat drugs and other regional threats, our requirements are modest. I have acknowledged to the Secretary of Defense that SOUTHCOM is an economy of force theater and I have promised

him that I will keep it that way. In Southern Command, we don't need carrier battle groups. We don't need armor divisions. We don't need fighter wings, and we don't need Marine Expeditionary Forces. We need modest numbers of the right kinds of people, with the right kind of training, performing the right mission, in the right places, at the right times.

Looking to the future, as I mentioned in the concluding segment of my written testimony, we require a theater architecture that will enable and facilitate our continuous and effective engagement.

I appreciate your recognition of that need in my invitation to testify. I have defined, what I considered to be, an appropriate and efficient theater presence for the 21st century. That presence or architecture includes the relocation of U.S. Army South to Fort Buchanan in Puerto Rico, maintenance of our important Central American presence at Soto Cano Air Base in Honduras, and if we're able to reach a satisfactory agreement with the Government of Panama, the establishment of a multinational counterdrug center with a robust United States element at what we now know as Howard Air Force Base.

Mr. Chairman, before I conclude my opening remarks, I would like, on the record, to thank you, to thank Congressman Barrett, to thank Congressman LaTourette, and to thank Congressman Souder for dedicating an entire Friday to visit the U.S. Army School of the Americas.

Since then, I've talked to Colonel Roy Trumble and his people down there, and irrespective of what your sentiments are on this school now, I just want you to know that it was a tremendous shot in the arm for them to be able to tell their story and to show you a little bit of their product line. So, thank you very much.

Sir, I look forward to your questions in the session that will follow.

[The prepared statement of General Wilhelm follows:]

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to provide you with my assessment of the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR). I have used the beginning of my tenure in SOUTHCOM to meet key regional military and civilian leaders, to build relationships within the interagency community, and to gain an in-depth, personal perspective of the region. I will provide a strategic assessment, review SOUTHCOM's major accomplishments, address our challenges, and present my vision for the future.

STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT

- ***Importance Of The Region To U.S. National Interests***

President Clinton has stated that the growing economic prosperity of the Latin American and Caribbean regions is of significant importance to U.S. national interests. As we enter the new millennium, U.S. trade with this region is envisioned to exceed trade with all of Europe. By 2010, U.S. trade with this region is projected to exceed trade with Europe and Japan combined.

No one questions the strategic importance of the Middle East, but Venezuela alone provides the same amount of oil to the U.S. as do all the Persian Gulf states combined. The discovery of major oil reserves in Colombia, and existing oil supplies in

Trinidad-Tobago and Ecuador, further increase the strategic importance of this region's energy resources.

During the last decade, the Western Hemisphere has clearly transitioned to democracy. Of the 32 nations in our theater, Cuba stands alone as the last bastion of a failed, archaic ideology. We remain ever hopeful that a peaceful transition to democracy will eventually occur which will allow for a free government and increased economic opportunities for the Cuban people. The fact that the region now has 16 civilian defense ministers also exemplifies the improving trend of military subordination to civil authority. However, the roots of democracy are not deeply anchored and will require support and role modeling to become institutionalized.

These nations are struggling to counter the threats of terrorism, international organized crime, and drug trafficking. We must remain actively engaged in this region to deter aggression, foster peaceful conflict resolution, and encourage democratic development while promoting stability and prosperity.

Beyond our strong economic ties with the region, we have important cultural ties. The U.S. has the world's fifth largest Spanish-speaking population. We share a commitment to peace and stability with democratic states of this hemisphere. Increasing regional cooperation and sustaining regional stability remain

the fundamental objectives of U.S. security interests throughout the hemisphere.

- ***Southcom and U.S. National Interests***

Peace Through Regional Engagement

SOUTHCOM supports the attainment of national objectives through our strategy of cooperative regional peacetime engagement. The strategy is crafted from national objectives and interests, and embodies the concepts of **shape**, **respond**, and **prepare now**. Using shared ideals we shape cooperative opportunities with other countries to create conditions which support the development of institutions that advance democracy and regional stability. SOUTHCOM will respond to hemispheric or regional challenges such as natural disasters, instability, narcotrafficking and other transnational dangers that threaten U.S. vital national interests. Ideally, the response will be multilateral, involving the cooperative participation of other nations within our hemisphere. SOUTHCOM will prepare now for an uncertain future and assist regional military and security forces in prudent preparations to strengthen multilateral commitment against future shared challenges.

Theater Resources

SOUTHCOM leverages scarce national resources for significant benefit. In FY97, DOD allocated $566 million to

SOUTHCOM. Our small in-theater force structure of approximately 5,700 personnel – nearly a 50% decrease since 1994 - maximizes the Total Force concept. In concert with our active duty forces, large numbers of guard and reserve forces deploy and exercise in the theater.

With the assistance of our National Guard and Reserve Components, we have been able to accomplish our assigned tasks. Last year, more than 50,000 National Guard and Reserve Component workdays supported over 3,000 deployments throughout our AOR. Additionally, in FY97 the Services provided over 100 work-years of reserve support to SOUTHCOM and its service components for counterdrug operations, exercise participation and to relieve active duty PERSTEMPO/OPTEMPO.

National Guard and Reserve units are fully integrated into SOUTHCOM's operational and functional plans and provide greater than 40% of all deployments within the region. Reserve component leaders serve as Commanders of U.S. Support Group Haiti and the Military Observer Mission for Ecuador and Peru. Reserve forces are a critical augmenting and reinforcing element of the Total Force capabilities that allow SOUTHCOM to attain a substantial return from a relatively small investment. However, small does not mean, "free."

SOUTHCOM requires a balanced forward military presence with a carefully crafted theater support architecture and balanced

augmenting and reinforcing forces. We must continue to maintain a modest troop level composed of soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines possessing the right skills, performing the right missions at the right place and time. Current crises facing our nation must be addressed. However, while we extinguish strategic brushfires elsewhere in the world it is important that we not lose sight of the need to make modest investments in people and resources to shape the future of Latin America and the Caribbean. Today's small investments in this hemisphere offer the promise of enormous returns in the next century.

- ***Landmark Year For Change***

This past year marked a period of profound change for SOUTHCOM. The most recent modification to the Unified Command Plan (UCP) fundamentally altered the character of SOUTHCOM's AOR. The addition of the Caribbean, its island nations and the ocean areas surrounding Central and South America changed the AOR from a land-locked theater to a truly balanced theater with continental, maritime, and aerospace dimensions. This change has necessitated a "bottom-up" review of the theater strategy. We are developing a revised strategy to comprehensively address the missions of regional cooperative engagement and counternarcotics support.

In the counterdrug arena, the UCP and National Interdiction Command and Control Plan modifications unified responsibilities for the transit and source zones under a single, regional combatant commander. Our regional counterdrug strategy now combines transit and source zone assets into a focused, coordinated, theater-wide counterdrug effort.

This is best illustrated by the improved command and control strategic linkages that have emerged between the two Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs) now under SOUTHCOM. JIATF-South, located in Panama, detects, monitors and tracks suspected drug activity in the source zone with a focus on the Republic of Panama and the landmass of South America. JIATF-East, located in Key West, Florida, conducts similar missions in the transit zone including the Caribbean, Central America, Eastern Pacific, and the waters surrounding the nations of the Andean Ridge.

As the strategic headquarters for the JIATFs, SOUTHCOM synchronizes theater counterdrug functions and activities, and ensures that the counterdrug missions in the region are properly resourced. This increases the efficiency and economy of operations throughout the theater, and provides for the seamless employment of all U.S. and allied counterdrug forces operating in the Western Hemisphere.

The September 1997 relocation of the headquarters represents another fundamental change for SOUTHCOM. Miami is the right strategic location for this command. The move enhances our ability to address the challenges accompanying our expanded UCP responsibilities. Additionally, South Florida is the "Gateway to the Americas" and the regional center of trade, finance, education, and culture. Our location at the regional transportation hub and collocation with the Caribbean and Latin American consulates facilitates our interactions with political, economic, and military leadership.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

- ***Regional Linkages And Engagement***

Each nation within our AOR is unique in its level of prosperity, stability and history. Yet, regional commonalities of geography, economic environment, and shared regional-specific threats link countries to regional approaches and security cooperation. Cooperation shapes the security environment to recognize shared challenges and to establish a common understanding of the nature of a future, requisite response.

SOUTHCOM's approach is founded upon hemispheric cooperation. We have an opportunity to further national interests and strengthen democratic institutions in Central and South America and the Caribbean. To do so requires focused

effort and teamwork. Successful initiatives or actions do not occur in isolation, but are integral parts of a cooperative effort. SOUTHCOM's essential tasks are to garner thought, ideas, and support through effective theater engagement.

- ***Military Observer Mission Ecuador Peru (MOMEP)***

The MOMEP is a result of shared thinking, ideas, and efforts, and continues to be perhaps the most highly successful peacekeeping operation in recent history. In an unprecedented move, this multinational, multi-million dollar peacekeeping operation has been fully funded by Peru and Ecuador--the nations in dispute. Recently, SOUTHCOM successfully transitioned the bulk of MOMEP mission support responsibilities to Brazil, Chile and Argentina. I believe MOMEP serves as a model for future peacekeeping situations as the U.S. transitions to a guiding vice leading role.

- ***Exercises and Training***

One of the primary vehicles for maintaining and expanding regional engagement is through our exercise and training programs. Bilateral exercises have been practically eliminated as we have aggressively pushed for integrated and coordinated regional approaches to regional challenges. SOUTHCOM's multilateral exercises focus on peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, counterdrug operations, and medical

training and assistance. These multilateral exercises and training events allow U.S. military forces and host nations to train together and exchange skills ranging from medical assessments and treatment to tactical maneuver and communications skills. These activities also serve to bring together varied nations; enhancing military-to-military confidence building measures, reinforcing respect for human rights and encouraging support for democratically elected institutions.

An important component of our multilateral exercise effort is the Distinguished Visitor Program, which brings together regional government, business and military leaders. Typically, these influential leaders have the chance to observe an exercise, sit as panel members in special exercise seminars and participate in exercise After Action Reviews. This forum provides an extraordinary opportunity for a high-level exchange of ideas and enhances confidence building and cooperation among regional counterparts.

Of special note, this past summer, Honduras hosted an exercise to coordinate Central America's regional response to natural disasters and humanitarian operations. The Honduran military planned, coordinated and executed the exercise. Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and observers from the Dominican Republic participated. This was the first Central

American exercise of its type to be conducted *without* U.S. support or participation. This exercise highlights SOUTHCOM's influence in helping to build Central American confidence in intra-regional coordination and cooperation.

- ***Security Assistance***

Security Assistance is a crucial element of U.S. national security strategy that fosters and supports cooperative regional arrangements. Cooperation and trust among traditional rivals is at an all time high. Military expenditures throughout this region are the lowest in the world. Nevertheless, Latin American and Caribbean militaries do have legitimate defense modernization requirements.

Against these requirements, the Foreign Military Financing Program (FMF) shrank from $221.3 million in FY91 to $2 million per year for FY96 and FY97. This limits SOUTHCOM's ability to influence the direction and scope of regional military modernization. We continue to work with the Department of State in support of the FMF program.

However, one of the most cost-effective means of encouraging development of democratic values and beliefs while shaping the region's militaries is through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. In FY97, this program provided training for 2,400 students from the region. Another important success story is the Expanded International

Military Education and Training (EIMET) program. Improving civil-military relations in the region can be traced to the EIMET program. These programs are providing a tangible contribution to the professionalization of defense establishments within democratic societies.

- ***U.S. Army School of the Americas***

The U.S. Army School of the Americas (USARSA) at Fort Benning, Georgia serves as a vital tool in attaining U.S. strategic objectives in Latin America and the Caribbean. The school offers theoretical and practical instruction that promotes democratic values, respect for human rights, and regional stability. USARSA provides an opportunity for Latin American military and civilian leaders to receive, in Spanish, the same instruction we provide our own defense forces.

Since its inception in 1946, more than 60,000 officers, noncommissioned officers, cadets and civilians have graduated from USARSA. The school produces graduates who make positive contributions to their countries through distinguished military and civilian public service. Concepts and values taught at USARSA were reaffirmed over the past decade as Latin American military governments transitioned to democracies. In many cases, the interpersonal relationships, forged during a common educational experience in the school, serve as a valuable tool for regional engagement while promoting stability.

- ***Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program***

The Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) program helps maintain our readiness posture, generates goodwill, and improves quality of life for people of the region.

During FY97, SOUTHCOM constructed or rehabilitated 2 roads, 32 schools, 10 clinics, and 18 water wells. We also conducted 60 medical readiness exercises providing quality medical care to those who might otherwise receive none. In FY98, deployments to 19 countries will provide similar support.

This year SOUTHCOM will conduct the first in a series of disease intervention exercises starting with Peru. These multilateral exercises are designed to address the causes, not just the effects, of diseases unique to this region.

- ***Humanitarian Assistance Program***

The Humanitarian Assistance (HA) program provides selected countries with non-lethal, excess DOD property to meet specific humanitarian needs. Last year we provided 28 shipments worth over $13 million to 20 different countries. Primarily medical and disaster relief supplies, these donations significantly boosted the limited medical infrastructure in recipient countries. We also provided medical care to the Haitian civilian population and initiated a Regional Medical Surveillance System in the Caribbean.

In FY98, SOUTHCOM has programmed 28 HA projects for 22 countries. Our HA budget of $2.1 million includes purchasing equipment for medical/disease surveillance systems, assisting malaria eradication efforts, and shipping disaster relief supplies, medical supplies, and fire-fighting equipment throughout the region.

- ***Human Rights***

SOUTHCOM's human rights program is a proactive engagement tool which has garnered increased support and respect for the tenets of human rights and international law among the region's security forces. Last June, SOUTHCOM sponsored a human rights seminar where representatives from militaries throughout the AOR met with members of the international human rights community to develop a consensus document creating a vision of regional militaries' responsibilities in human rights. Five main areas of responsibility were identified: (1) human rights and military doctrine, (2) human rights education and training, (3) internal control mechanisms (e.g., prevention, investigation, accountability), (4) external control of the military/subordination to civilian authority, and (5) clear delineation of military and police roles. More recently, a follow-on seminar was conducted to develop specific recommendations on ways that regional militaries can institutionalize human rights in doctrine, education, training

and operational practices. Additionally, methods were developed to assist in measuring progress toward attaining these human rights objectives.

- ***Demining***

SOUTHCOM Special Operations forces are assisting Organization of American States and the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) demining operations in Central America. Our goal is to develop self-sustaining national demining programs in the participating nations. U.S. forces provide training, technical advice, and logistical support to the International Demining team located in Danli, Honduras.

Humanitarian demining operations are being conducted in Honduras, Costa Rica and Nicaragua. On 5 Feb 1998, the Interagency Working Group for Humanitarian demining approved Guatemala for demining operations. The IADB and SOUTHCOM will conduct a resource determination and site survey in Guatemala during March of this year. On-site demining operations should commence shortly thereafter.

As a result of these demining efforts, 1,672 mines have been destroyed and 73,741 square meters of land cleared in Nicaragua; 1,923 mines were destroyed and 166,637 square meters of land cleared in Honduras; and 37 mines were destroyed and 33,076 square meters of land were cleared in Costa Rica. Honduras and Costa Rica should complete their demining programs

during the 2nd Qtr of FY99. To date, the International Demining Team has cleared mines that were impeding access to a series of electrical transmission towers in Nicaragua that supply energy to the central region. In the near future, a series of bridges that link the populated areas around Managua to the ports on the Atlantic Coast will be cleared of mines. As a derivative benefit, the Department of Defense has been actively engaged with the Nicaraguan military for the first time in over a decade. In addition, U.S. Marine forces are rapidly clearing our own minefields inside the confines of Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

- ***Counterdrug***

While the progress toward our national objective of a democratic, peaceful, and prosperous hemisphere has been substantial, narcotics trafficking remains a major challenge in the region. In simple terms, the threat posed by drug trafficking is an ambush in the path toward achieving our national objectives. Fighting through this ambush with a minimum of capital investment, our drug interdiction operations are having a significant effect on the flow of illegal drugs throughout the hemisphere. Coca cultivation has decreased more than twenty-seven percent in Peru and five percent in Bolivia. Additionally, our airbridge interdiction efforts are disrupting the aerial shipment of coca thereby forcing the narcotraffickers

to adapt by moving to alternative air, ground and water transportation modes, and by relocating coca cultivation and laboratory processing sites. The opportunity exists to counter these new methods of growing, processing, and shipment, and ultimately affects narcotraffickers' motivation--profit. Enhanced engagement with national security forces will serve to constrict the ends of the drug pipeline. At the same time, the entire region must be postured to close down cross border support for narcotrafficking, stem the erosion of national sovereignty, and achieve a regional response to a shared threat.

The nations of the Hemisphere are recognizing narcotrafficking as a shared threat and a threat to national sovereignty. Regional law enforcement forces, which have the lead role, are progressing in the struggle against narcotrafficking within their borders. This is largely the result of successful engagement by various U.S. agencies with host nations. The threat to national sovereignty is largely unchallenged as a regional effort. Regional militaries should assist civilian law enforcement agencies in the protection of their national sovereignty against a threat which knows no borders. SOUTHCOM's engagement must support these efforts. Where we are conducting military engagement, we are seeing success. Where our military engagement is limited, progress is limited.

In the source zone, Operation LASER STRIKE, our airbridge interdiction effort, continues to have a significant impact in deterring illegal air traffic along the Peru-Colombia airbridge. In combined operations with Peru and Colombia, aerial and ground assets continue to degrade the narcotraffickers' ability to move coca base from cultivation areas in Peru to processing sites in Colombia. Last year alone, 27 narcotrafficking aircraft were either shot down, strafed, or seized by Peruvian and Colombian end-game forces.

Riverine interdiction programs have been developed for Peru and Colombia that will significantly improve the riverine interdiction capabilities of those nations. Key elements of the Peru plan include establishing a Joint Riverine Training Center in Iquitos; training and equipping twelve operational Riverine Interdiction Units; and procuring and outfitting three Floating Support Bases. The training center will commence operations this summer with the first operational unit coming online during the 4th quarter of FY98.

We are initiating a similar program to enhance the existing Colombian Riverine program. Key elements of the Colombia plan include improving infrastructure, providing spare parts, upgrading existing communications and navigation equipment, enhancing personnel protective equipment, sourcing additional

riverine patrol craft and improving the quality and depth of training.

These riverine initiatives are designed to provide Peru and Colombia unilateral capabilities to apply pressure along critical avenues where the narcotraffickers currently enjoy almost uncontested freedom of movement.

In the transit zone, there has been a notable increase in the willingness of Caribbean and Central American nations to participate in combined interdiction operations. Operations SUMMER STORM and BLUE SKIES are excellent examples. Operations in the eastern Caribbean have effectively teamed U.S. helicopter and transportation support with participating nation forces and surface assets.

Due to limited resources, transit zone maritime interdiction operations have been focused on the Caribbean where cooperation from all nations including France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands has produced positive results.

Transit and source zone radar networks play a critical role in interdiction operations. The Puerto Rico ROTHR site, to be activated next year, along with source zone radar commercialization will enhance capabilities while reducing overall costs and personnel tempo.

CHALLENGES

While there is justification for optimism based on the wave of democratic reform that has swept through our region, we recognize that many of these emerging democracies are fragile and will require our continued support, assistance and nurturing as they mature. While insurgencies and border disputes continue to undermine stability in some countries, the greatest threats that confront the region are transnational in nature. They include international organized crime, drugs, terrorism, illegal migration and arms trafficking.

- ***International Organized Crime***

International criminal organizations threaten stability, corrupt government officials, and hinder some governments' abilities to protect their citizens. Crimes include drug and arms trafficking, theft, smuggling of illegal migrants, kidnappings, and money laundering. Many governments lack the resources to counter these threats. Insofar as international crime erodes national sovereignty, regional militaries can play an appropriate role in support of law enforcement efforts. SOUTHCOM engagement helps regional militaries to assume and perform these roles and missions within a democratic context.

- ***Drugs***

Though we have enjoyed some success in reducing production in the source zone, and our interdiction efforts have led to the interception of appreciable quantities of illegal drugs destined for the United States, supply continues to match demand and we see a number of challenges before us. The three most significant are: (1) obtaining sufficient detection, monitoring and tracking assets to cover all transit routes; (2) developing the common operating picture required to coordinate and orchestrate hemispheric counterdrug operations, and (3) sustaining counterdrug operations at current levels.

During 1997, we were provided sufficient DOD and interagency resources to cover approximately $1/5^{th}$ of the transit and source zones, $1/5^{th}$ of the time. Through judicious application of assets and sound intelligence cueing, we were able to provide generally effective coverage of the source zone and the transit routes through the Caribbean. We have been unable, however, to mount effective detection, monitoring and tracking operations in the Eastern Pacific, a pipeline which feeds Mexico and ultimately the U.S. Due to worldwide competition for resources, we found it necessary to postpone the execution phase of CAPER FOCUS, an operation which promised to make substantial inroads into trafficking along the Eastern Pacific littorals. SOUTHCOM is working with the Joint Staff and

interagency community to identify the detection, monitoring and tracking and other capabilities needed to execute CAPER FOCUS. Our inability to initiate this operation is yet another indicator of how thinly stretched our increasingly sparse DOD assets have become.

The development of a common operating picture or system that will enable us to display simultaneously and in real time data developed by multiple collectors and operating agencies will improve the efficiency and effectiveness of both U.S. and multilateral counterdrug operations. Absent this capability, seams are created which are exploited by traffickers, and handoffs of tracks of interest and prosecution of end game operations are significantly impeded. We have stressed to our neighbors that drugs are a hemispheric problem, which demands a hemispheric solution. Development of the common operating picture will remove one of the major obstacles to hemispheric cooperation.

In the face of continued reductions in forces and budgets, we will be hard-pressed to sustain operations during 1998 at the same levels as 1997. Ongoing, long duration contingency operations in Bosnia, continued support for the Government of Haiti, increased emphasis on demand side strategies, and the low priority accorded counterdrug operations in the Global Military

Forces Policy all have impact on the kinds and quantities of DOD and non-DOD assets available to SOUTHCOM.

To sustain the progress that has been made in the source zone countries of Peru and Bolivia, to continue our successful interdiction of the Andean Ridge air bridge, to close the Eastern Pacific "backdoor" and to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of hemispheric counterdrug operations will require interagency consensus and continued emphasis on CD operations within the context of threats to our national interests and security.

- ***Terrorism***

Regional insurgent groups such as the Sendero Luminoso, Tupac Amaru, FARC and the ELN pose credible threats to the governments and citizens of the nations in this region. In recent years, major international terrorist groups, including Hizballah, have turned to Latin America as a safe-haven for support bases to sustain worldwide operations. Though U.S. Personnel and forces have not been the subject of attack, we are sensitive to their vulnerability.

To combat terrorism, SOUTHCOM has developed an active anti-terrorism program. Individual awareness is the primary weapon in our anti-terrorism arsenal. We require full compliance with SOUTHCOM and CJCS-directed anti-terrorism awareness training requirements before allowing any forces to enter the region. In

addition, SOUTHCOM assessment teams review force protection/anti-terrorism programs and facilities of DOD and non-DOD activities to identify and correct vulnerabilities. Force protection/anti-terrorism responsibilities have been clearly delineated, and we work closely with country teams to help eliminate gaps and seams in this shared responsibility.

Several efforts are ongoing to strengthen our anti-terrorism posture. Procurement and upgrading of light armored vehicles for personnel transportation and enhanced communications capabilities are high priority initiatives throughout the region. Acquisition of the land surrounding the Headquarters is required to achieve adequate force protection standoff distances, while acquisition of the Headquarters building is the most cost effective means to support SOUTHCOM mission requirements. Physical security upgrade projects are being pursued for the U.S. Support Group - Haiti, JTF-Bravo in Honduras, source zone radar sites, and Guantanamo Naval Base. SOUTHCOM is sensitive to the imperative requirement for an effective force protection posture. We monitor closely the activities of our deployed personnel and units and move proactively when any change or intensification of threats is detected.

- ***Illegal Migration***

The SOUTHCOM AOR has become a major avenue for both intra- and inter-hemispheric illegal migration. This migration places a strain through economic and social imbalances on the governments of the region. If unchecked, these imbalances can threaten a nation's sovereignty and internal stability. Only through a cooperative approach between governmental agencies, non-governmental organizations, and private voluntary organizations can we fashion an effective response. While the responsibility of routine migration operations resides with the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice, mass migration poses a particular challenge for SOUTHCOM. The capabilities required to conduct emergency mass migrant operations, if and when directed by the President, reside within our Service components. These Service component capabilities are important, and given regional political and economic uncertainties, may well be required in the future just as they were during the 1994 Caribbean migration crisis. While we remain poised to mitigate the effects of major illegal migrations, first emphasis is on prevention. Through proactive regional cooperative engagement, and in cooperation with other U.S. Government agencies, we seek to help identify and eliminate the causes for population displacement before they occur.

- ***Illegal Arms Transfers***

In Latin America and the Caribbean, illegal arms transfers pose a serious threat. Arms caches from civil wars, black markets, military weapons captured by insurgents, and illegal seepage from military armories severely complicate the regional governments' abilities to maintain law and order. For example, well-armed guerrillas, paramilitary organizations, and narcotraffickers challenge governmental control in Colombia. If these organizations acquire more technologically advanced systems, governments will face an even greater threat. SOUTHCOM's challenge is to develop a cooperative approach with regional security forces to identify, stem and ultimately stop the illegal flow of arms within the region. A good first step was the passage in the Organization of American States of the *Inter-American Convention Against Illicit Production Of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Related Materials*, now awaiting Senate ratification.

- ***Legal Arms Transfers: Modernization***

Politically and militarily, Latin America is in transformation. Though the region is at peace, Latin American militaries have legitimate modernization requirements. By following a rational and responsible, case-by-case review process for the sale of advanced weapon systems, the U.S. has the opportunity to shape modernization efforts of Latin American

security forces. Our nation has made great strides in creating an atmosphere of mutual trust and cooperation. We are now witnessing a new era of trust, confidence and defense transparency between nations that only recently viewed their neighbors as adversaries. Some striking examples of this changing atmosphere are the Argentina-Brazil joint exercises, possible Argentina-Chile joint exercises, the multilateral exercises conducted by SOUTHCOM in Central and South America, and Chile's recent public release of its Defense Strategy--a first for Latin America.

The progress of regional democracies in maintaining open and amicable relations with neighboring states is influenced primarily by domestic conditions and the conviction that national sovereignty is assured. Latin American nations are taking steps to modernize their militaries. Purchasing weapons systems from the U.S. brings with it full multi-year support and the desirable element of transparency. Most importantly, the U.S. is able to influence the employment of these weapon systems through training, doctrinal development, and levels of technology release, while enhancing hemispheric cooperative engagement.

- ***Radio Frequency Spectrum Usage***

The radio frequency spectrum is a finite resource that must be shared by the public and private sectors. Current proposals

assume significant revenue generation from the sale of the radio frequency spectrum now reserved for military use. However, spectrum reallocation legislation should contain appropriate consideration for future warfighting requirements. We are fully supportive of efforts to balance the federal ledgers, but believe the loss of certain critical spectrum segments may have unintended consequences. The expense to refit communications, navigational and weapons systems on key military platforms might negate the anticipated revenue gains from spectrum sales. SOUTHCOM fully supports the development of a National Spectrum Strategy. This approach will minimize the risk to future military operations while protecting national security. Spectrum sharing in both the public and private sector can be accomplished effectively and affordably if appropriately planned.

- ***Specific Country Challenges***

Paraguay

Paraguay's May 1998 presidential election will represent that nation's first democratic transition from one civilian president to another in 50 years. However, the election is threatened by a weak process. General Oviedo's influence further complicates the issue. In April 1996, then Army Commander General Oviedo challenged President Wasmosy's control of the military by initially refusing to obey a presidential

order to retire. Although currently under house arrest, General Oviedo enjoys strong public support and is the presidential nominee of the Colorado Party that has dominated Paraguayan politics for the past 50 years. Paradoxically, he could be the next constitutionally elected President. Our concerns in Paraguay center on persistent indications that some national leaders, to include the military, might consider extra-constitutional measures to block General Oviedo's candidacy thereby undermining the integrity of the nation and its democratic processes.

Haiti

Political adversities in Haiti have hindered progress toward achieving a self-sustaining democratic process that is capable of advancing political and economic reforms. The President has assigned SOUTHCOM the mission of maintaining a periodic exercise presence. U.S. Support Group, Haiti, will remain in country to provide command, control and logistical support to U.S. forces conducting port calls and exercises. The Support Group has no security mission beyond force protection.

In FY98, six schools will be built or renovated, five wells will be drilled and 130 separate medical site visits will be conducted. The U.S. Navy and Coast Guard will conduct nine port-calls each involving a civic assistance project in Port Au Prince. Construction of the maritime operational facility in

Jacmel will commence in mid-summer 1998. This project will enhance the U.S. and Haitian Coast Guard's ability to combat the illegal flow of drugs from South America into Haiti.

We have aggressively sought to cut costs for Haiti operations. Our initial cost savings measure reduced the U.S. military footprint in Haiti through a reduction in the Support Group staff. Other reductions will be implemented in the 3rd quarter of FY98, without sacrificing our program of activities. SOUTHCOM is committed to supporting interagency efforts that nurture the democratic process. Ministerial Advisory Teams, attached to the U.S. Embassy, provide advice and assistance at the highest levels of the Haitian government on issues such as prisoner registry, enforcing customs laws and contraband control. U.S. military forces provide a visible and stabilizing presence, while periodic exercises are focused on Humanitarian and Civic Assistance and Humanitarian Assistance projects that enhance the Haitian quality of life.

Colombia

Colombia continues to be a troubled state plagued by violent insurgencies, paramilitary forces, and drug trafficking. While most of the region's insurgents have disappeared due to a lack of international sponsorship, two groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), survive. Both use narcotrafficking, kidnapping and

extortion to bankroll their operations. Their existence seriously jeopardizes peace and economic progress. Insurgents and rogue paramilitary forces continue to violate the rights of innocent citizens. The FARC and ELN are not only dangers to Colombia, they also threaten bordering countries. To combat these insurgents, regional police and military forces must increase coordination and cooperation. The Colombian Army is currently on the defensive. As part of a comprehensive approach to both the narcotrafficking and insurgency problems, our engagement with the Colombian military will address deficiencies that Colombian security forces have shown in performing their counternarcotics mission.

SOUTHCOM just concluded a very successful Andean Ridge Chiefs of Mission Conference in which Andean Ridge Ambassadors, DOS, NSA, JS, DOD, CIA and DIA reviewed Colombia's instability and its effect on the region. Discussions were fruitful reaching consensus on a wide range of issues including developing initiatives for a regional approach, promoting European involvement, and increasing engagement opportunities.

STRATEGY

- ***Vision***

SOUTHCOM's vision is a community of stable, democratic nations with professional, modernized, interoperable security

forces that embrace democratic principles and human rights, that are subordinate to civil authority, and are capable and supportive of multilateral responses to regional challenges.

Success in our theater requires a balanced approach to conducting regional engagement and counterdrug operations. A strategic link exists in varying degrees between these two missions in each country in our region. We seek to establish the correct balance between these missions in each country to meet that country's specific requirements. Our strategy requires a well thought out and carefully crafted theater architecture to ensure that our numerically small forces are positioned in a way that will enable them to engage continuously and conduct efficient and cost-effective regional engagement and counterdrug operations.

SOUTHCOM must prepare now. The command will continue to leverage efficiencies by capitalizing on emerging technologies and revolutions in business and military affairs. However, as we integrate the concepts of Joint Vision 2010, the command must be vigilant to maintain interoperability with legacy systems employed by regional security forces. Therefore, SOUTHCOM must assist in modernizing and improving the interoperability of regional security forces. As we prepare to meet future challenges, special emphasis must be given to consequence management and the activities that must be accomplished

following crisis termination. Throughout this process, force protection and quality of life of the force will be emphasized and sustained. Refined and coordinated country-specific force protection programs, coupled with enhanced threat acquisition, analysis and capabilities, will reduce the vulnerability of our personnel and facilities while advancing mission accomplishment.

- ***Theater Architecture & Forward Presence***

Central to the effective execution of our mission is a properly structured theater architecture and an appropriate level and balance of forward military presence. These essential elements support theater engagement activities, counternarcotics operations, and will allow a rapid response to theater crises. The infrastructure in Panama provides a secure gateway to South America. While we hope negotiations with Panama for the establishment of a regional Multinational Counternarcotics Center (MCC) will come to a successful conclusion soon, the outcome of negotiations is uncertain. Soto Cano Air Base in Honduras continues to be an effective and efficient anchor point to support operations and exercises in Central America. Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico, will grow to serve as the gateway to support theater engagement and counternarcotics operations in the Caribbean.

In a region where the army historically dominates military forces, our partners view the relocation of United States Army

South (USARSO) to Puerto Rico as an important signal of our continued commitment to them and to their security needs. Manned by soldiers who possess long-term experience and sensitivity to regional issues and cultures, USARSO is expert at shaping regional militaries, responding to regional crises and supporting our regional partners' preparations for an uncertain future. The relocation to Puerto Rico will permit us to capitalize on an existing, robust partnership and achieve the full and complementary integration of USARSO and Puerto Rican National Guard and Reserve components, thereby fully exploiting the unique capabilities of the Total Force.

To further enhance SOUTHCOM's naval activities in regional engagement, I urge U.S. ratification of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS). The Convention embodies the concept of the rule of law with regard to the use of the world's oceans and is consistent with U.S. national interests. The freedom of navigation and over-flight rights reflected in the Convention are of utmost importance to maintain operational flexibility of U.S. forces to protect U.S. vital interests. In the SOUTHCOM AOR there are several nations with excessive maritime claims or restrictions inconsistent with the Convention. The U.S. is engaged in diplomatic and operational initiatives to encourage these nations to conform their maritime claims to the provisions contained in the Convention. As non-Parties to the Convention,

the authoritative weight of U.S. efforts is diminished. By joining the other 120 nations, which are Parties to the Convention, the U.S. will be better postured to further U.S. interests in the hemisphere.

CONCLUSION

Looking to the future, the United States Southern Command faces an intriguing mixture of challenges and opportunities. By and large this is a "good news" theater. . .nowhere have the objectives of our national strategy of engagement and enlargement been more widely achieved. This is also an economy of force theater, and it is our intention to keep it so. We do not need armor brigades, carrier battle groups, fighter wings, or Marine Expeditionary Forces. Rather, as asserted in the body of this posture statement, we simply need modest numbers of the right kinds of troops, with the right skills, performing the right missions, in the right places, at the right times. This is not a theater built on treaties, formal alliances, standard written agreements, or protocols. Instead, it is a theater and a region that runs on handshakes and personal relationships. An indispensable ingredient for our future success will be an adequate theater architecture. In very simple terms, our interests in Latin America cannot be superintended from North America. We must maintain a compact but visible presence in the region. I consider it imperative that when United States Army

South leaves Panama, as it must under the terms of the Canal Treaties, that it relocate to Fort Buchanan in Puerto Rico. There, our active component planners and programmers can join forces with nearly 15,000 aggressive, hard-charging, bilingual Guardsmen and reservists. The result will be a unique total force team, focused on the region and sensitive to its cultures. With the SOUTHCOM Headquarters at the strategic hub in Miami, USARSO in Puerto Rico, Joint Task Force Bravo minding the store in Central America from Soto Cano, and with JIATF South as the United States element of a Multinational Counterdrug Center, in Panama or elsewhere, we will be well-postured to execute our theater strategy and prosecute the war on drugs as we enter the third millennium.

Mr. HASTERT. Thank you, General.

Mr. Marshall, please proceed with your opening statement.

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee. It's really an honor to be here today, and I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss DEA programs. I also would like to, sincerely, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the members of this subcommittee for your continued support of DEA and its programs, your continued support of all the antidrug programs in the U.S. Government, and your interest in the drug problem in general, both internationally and domestically. I've submitted a written statement for the record, and in my comments here, I will try to briefly summarize the drug-trafficking situation in and around the Caribbean.

The international drug syndicates which are operating throughout the Western Hemisphere, today, are resourceful, adaptable, wealthy, sophisticated, extremely powerful groups, much more so than traditional organized crime which we have encountered in the United States since the turn of the century.

These modern organized crime syndicates have at their disposal a veritable arsenal of technology, equipment, weapons and wealth which enable them to dominate the illegal drug market very, very effectively. Their wealth and power also allows them to bribe and intimidate, not only public officials, but average citizens. And, their strength, in this regard presents substantial challenges to law enforcement. In order for us to effectively dismantle these organizations, we must take a hemispheric approach to attack these groups.

The vast majority of the cocaine entering the United States today, as you know, comes from the source countries of Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. What you may not know is that heroin produced in Colombia now represents about 52 percent of the heroin seized in the United States last year. Colombian traffickers continue to dominate the movement of cocaine into Colombia where it is processed into hydrochloride, and once the hydrochloride is manufactured in Colombia, it's shipped either by maritime, commercial air, cargo, that sort of thing, either through Mexico or through the Caribbean Corridor to United States entry points.

In the last few years, Colombian traffickers, because of law enforcement pressure in the United States, South America, and the Caribbean, have been forced to turn to experienced Mexican drug smugglers to move their products more effectively into the United States. The Mexican organizations have evolved to the point that they now control, virtually, all of the cocaine in the Western half of the United States and for the first time, recently, we've seen the Mexican organizations moving to expand their territory to East Coast markets.

The Caribbean has been a long time traditional favorite smuggling route of both the Cali and Medellin Cartels to smuggle, literally, thousands of tons of cocaine into the United States annually. The drug cartels in the early 1970's and 1980's, back during the heyday of the Medellin Cartel and the days of the cocaine cowboys, established a number of smuggling routes into the United States throughout the Central Caribbean, including Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, and the Bahamas into South Florida, and other places in the United States.

Well, since the 1970's and 1980's, we, of course, have destroyed the Medellin Cartel and our current focus is on the Cali organizations command and control structures. I have to comment a bit on how we destroyed the Medellin Cartel and how the Cali group has now been really, largely placed on the ropes.

We view the drug traffic, really, as a seamless continuum. The drug traffickers do not recognize international borders and we, in our operations, have tried to take a similar approach to counter those organizations. We found, however, that one of our major tools is the indictment, arrest, and extradition of major command-in-control figures of these organizations back to face U.S. justice. To face U.S. justice where they cannot buy their way out of prison, where they cannot obtain a lenient sentence, where they cannot, perhaps, escape or live a life of luxury in penitentiaries. And, these groups have come to fear the U.S. criminal justice system. Because of our progress, both domestically and internationally, we have seen a change in the Cali Cartel to the point that they are, somewhat, disorganized now. And, we're now seeing independent groups of traffickers springing up in the Northern part of Colombia, the Northern Valle del Cauca, and there are splinter groups springing up from the Cali Cartel. And, these groups have risen to prominence and they're responsible, now, for large amounts of cocaine and heroin coming into the United States through the Caribbean. These groups tend to be smaller, less organized, but they continue to very effectively control their trade through bribery, intimidation, violence, that sort of thing.

The threat we face in the Caribbean is constantly changing. One of the reasons then—one of the changes that we see right now—I am referring to the Mexican trafficking groups and the Mexican trafficking groups in the process of becoming more powerful began, recently, to charge their commissions in a different way. They used to charge a flat fee commission to the Colombian groups for smuggling cocaine. They have begun, in the last few years, to take half of the actual loads. And, this has enabled them to become more powerful in the United States, but it's also resulted in greater expense for moving their product to the Colombian traffickers.

Now in the meantime, the Dominican groups and the Puerto Rican groups will offer these same services for either a flat fee, as the Mexicans used to, or for a 20 percent or so commission. So, we believe that many of the Colombian groups, now, may be returning to the more traditional smuggling routes in the Caribbean, and that this may account for some of the very, very recent large seizures that we've seen in the Caribbean by my colleagues here at the table.

We've identified a number of separate groups of traffickers that operate in Colombia, and those groups are significant forces in the United States heroin and cocaine market. And, I've identified some of those groups in my written statement.

Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands are the U.S. southern most points of entry, and as such, they provide an excellent gateway for drugs destined to the East Coast of the United States. More importantly, Puerto Rico's commonwealth status means that once the drugs get into Puerto Rico, they are virtually, for all practical pur-

poses, in U.S. territory and subject, generally, to very little further scrutiny as they come into the United States.

Puerto Rico is located less than 400 miles from Colombia's north coast, and it's easily reachable from there by twin-engine aircraft hauling payloads of 5 pounds to 700 pounds of cocaine. It's easily reachable by go-fast boats, who can make the roundtrips from Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Haiti in, probably, less than a day.

Today, the cocaine and heroin producers from Colombia have transformed Puerto Rico into one of the most important staging areas in the Caribbean for smuggling their product into the United States. We've also identified several major groups operating in Puerto Rico and, as I said, with the Colombian groups, I've identified those groups in more detail in my written statement.

Turning to the Dominican Republic, in the past, historically, the Dominicans' role in illegal drug trafficking was limited to being pick-up crews, and couriers for the Colombian and Puerto Rican smugglers. A lot has changed in the last few years due to the evolution of the trade and there's now a new breed of Dominican traffickers. This new breed of traffickers, not only serves as pick-up crews and couriers, but they're also smugglers, transporters, and even wholesalers of Colombian heroin and cocaine in many parts of the United States. In the last year, Dominican criminals have emerged as a major force in both, the heroin and cocaine traffic in the Eastern United States.

Turning to Haiti, this island is a country that's strategically [located] in the Central Caribbean. It's in an ideal position to facilitate the movement of cocaine and heroin from Colombia into the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico.

Mr. HASTERT. Will the gentleman suspend for a second?

Mr. MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. HASTERT. It is the intent of the Chair not to recess during this vote. If somebody would like to go vote, I will carry through, and come back as quick as you can.

Thank you.

The gentleman may continue.

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you.

Haiti and Dominican Republic on the island of Hispaniola share similar coastal features and this facilitates inter-island boat traffic. There's effectively no border control between those two countries which allows, virtually, unimpeded traffic through Haiti, through the Dominican Republic and into Puerto Rico, and in some cases, directly into the United States. With regard to Haitian traffickers, we have seen, very recently, that Haitian traffickers have begun distributing cocaine in the United States, primarily, in Florida at the wholesale level. This represents a change from their traditional role in the United States at the lower level of the traffic.

The Bahamas island chain has been a center of contraband smuggling for centuries, I suppose, and it actually remains a conduit for air and maritime drug shipments moving through there and into the United States. Transportation groups located in the Bahamas utilize a variety of methods to move their cocaine from the islands into the United States. This has been a threat for a while now, and to counter the threat in that Northern Caribbean

area, the United States Government initiated in 1982 Operation BAT or Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos. Over the years, this operation has been pretty effective and we believe that it was, at least, one factor in the Colombians' decision to start moving through Mexico. But, now many of the changes that I described with regard to the Mexicans have begun to result in changes in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico.

Now, in response to the threat posed in the Caribbean, the perhaps emerging threat now, DEA has enhanced our Caribbean field division personnel by 25 special agents in fiscal year 1997. We plan to add another 20 agents in fiscal year 1998 to that division, and perhaps as many as 54 in fiscal year 1999. We have also added about 40 additional agents in Florida and the Bahamas. We remain committed, Mr. Chairman, to our primary goal, which is to identify, target, and arrest the major command and control figures in the traffic, whether they're operating in the United States or in foreign countries. In order to achieve that goal, we must have effective United States interagency cooperation, as well as, trustworthy and competent agencies in the Caribbean and South America with whom we can work side by side.

I thank you again for the opportunity to testify and I'll be happy to try to answer any questions the subcommittee may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Marshall follows:]

Statement of
Donnie Marshall
Acting Deputy Administrator
Drug Enforcement Administration
before the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee
Subcommittee on
National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice
March 12, 1998

Mr. Chairman, Members of the subcommittee: I appreciate the opportunity to appear today to discuss drug trafficking in South America and the Caribbean. First, I would like to sincerely thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the members of the subcommittee for your continued support of DEA and its programs, both internationally and on the homefront. You have continually showed your support by traveling within the United States, South America, and the Caribbean, to see first hand the devastation caused by the poison that flows from the drug producing and transit regions to the streets of our country.

The international drug syndicates operating throughout our hemisphere are resourceful, adaptable and extremely powerful. These syndicates have an unprecedented level of sophistication and they are far more powerful and influential than any organized crime enterprise preceding them. Traditional organized crime, operating within the United States from the turn of the century to the present, simply cannot compare to the Colombian and Mexican organizations operating in the U.S. and the Caribbean. Today's international crime syndicates have at their disposal an arsenal of technology, weapons and allies---corrupted law enforcement and government officials—enabling them to dominate the illegal drug market in ways we never thought possible. These modern day drug syndicate leaders oversee a multi-billion dollar cocaine and heroin industry which affects every aspect of American life.

The drug lords, in Colombia and Mexico, who mastermind transglobal organizations, are responsible for all facets of the drug trade, and are almost immune to conventional law enforcement strategies. Any effective program must address the threat they pose in a hemispheric approach. The drug traffickers'

control the drug trade from the jungles of South America, to the transshipment corridors in the Caribbean and Central America, to the streets of almost every city and town in America. Their army of workers is responsible for logistical support -- transporting the drugs, arranging for storage, renting a fleet of cars and using cell phones and faxes to ensure the smooth operations of the syndicates. All the business decisions regarding the shipment and sale of drugs, as well as the laundering of proceeds, are made from headquarters locations in South America, far away from our city streets.

The South American Source Zone

The vast majority of the cocaine entering the United States continues to come from the source countries of Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. Heroin produced in Colombia represented 52% of the heroin seized in the United States last year. For nearly two decades, crime groups from Colombia ruled the drug trade with an iron fist, exponentially increasing their profit margins by controlling the entire seamless continuum of the cocaine trade, from coca leaf production in Peru, Bolivia and Colombia to cocaine hydrochloride (HCl) production in processing centers in Colombia, to the wholesale distribution of cocaine on the streets of the United States.

Colombian traffickers continue to dominate the movement of cocaine from the jungles of Bolivia and Peru to the large cocaine HCl conversion factories in Southern Colombia. An estimated 15% of the world' s coca leaf is grown in Colombia and the vast majority of the cocaine base and cocaine HCl is produced in laboratories throughout Colombia. Many of these activities take place in the southern rainforests and eastern lowlands of Colombia. Most of the coca cultivation in Colombia occurs in the Departments of Guaviare, Caqueta, and Putumayo. Also, cultivation occurs in areas of high insurgency that are effectively beyond the control of the Colombian Government. Cocaine conversion labs range from small "family" operations to large facilities, employing dozens of workers. Once the cocaine HCl is manufactured, it is either shipped via maritime or aircraft to traffickers in Mexico, or shipped through the Caribbean corridor, including the Bahamian Island chain, to U.S. entry points in Puerto Rico, Miami and New York City.

Colombian traffickers, due to increased law enforcement pressure in South America and the Caribbean, were forced to turn to experienced Mexican drug smugglers to move their products into the United States. Initially, these Mexican organizations received payment for their services in the form of cocaine, rather than cash, exponentially increasing their profits. The Mexican organizations now control virtually all cocaine sold in the western half of the United States and, for the first time, DEA is seeing a concerted effort on the part of the Mexican traffickers to expand into the lucrative east coast markets.

The Increasing Significance of the Caribbean

The Colombian trafficking organizations' presence and influence in the Caribbean are overwhelming. The Caribbean has long been a favorite smuggling route used by the Cali and Medellin crime groups to smuggle thousands of tons of cocaine to the United States. During the late 1970's and the 1980's, drug lords from Medellin and Cali, Colombia established a labyrinth of smuggling routes throughout the central Caribbean, including Haiti, the Dominican Republic and the Bahamian Island chain to South Florida, using a variety of smuggling techniques to transfer their cocaine to U. S. markets. Smuggling scenarios included airdrops of 500-700 kilograms in the Bahamian Island chain and off the coast of Puerto Rico, mid-ocean boat-to-boat transfers of 500 to 2,000 kilograms, and the commercial shipment of multi-tons of cocaine through the port of Miami.

Our focus on the Cali organization's command and control functions in the U.S. enabled us to build formidable cases against the Cali leaders, which allowed our Colombian counterparts to accomplish the almost unimaginable-- the arrest and incarceration of the entire infrastructure of the most powerful crime group in history. Although Miguel Rodriguez Orejeula and his confederates continue to direct a portion of their operations from prison they are no longer able to maintain control over this once monolithic giant. Now, independent groups of traffickers from the Northern Valle dal Cauca, and splinter groups from the Cali syndicate have risen to prominence and are responsible for huge volumes of cocaine and heroin being shipped to the United States through the Caribbean. These groups who have replaced the highly structured, centrally controlled business operations of the Cali group, tend to be smaller and less organized, however, they continue to rely on fear and violence to expand and control their trafficking empires. The

exponential increase in the flow of cocaine and heroin through the region has brought a new wave of drug abuse and attendant violence to the tranquil Caribbean.

The threat we now face in the Caribbean is constantly changing. Mexican trafficking groups normally charge Colombian traffickers 50% of each shipment to transport their product through Mexico to the U.S. Meanwhile, Puerto Rican and Dominican groups offer the same service for as low as 20%. Thus, many Colombian groups, particularly those who have risen to power since the Cali syndicate' s fall, have returned to traditional smuggling routes in the Caribbean. This has resulted in larger shipments of cocaine transiting the Caribbean. Seizures of 500 to 2,000 kilograms of cocaine are now common in and around Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic. As an example, in October 1996, 6.5 metric tons of cocaine was seized from the freighter *Limerick*, after Cuban officials searched the vessel at our request. The cocaine from the freighter was destined to be off-loaded in the Bahamas where it would be transported to the U.S. by "go-fast" boats.

The following traffickers are among the most wealthy and powerful criminals operating in Colombia today:

Jairo Ivan Urdinola Grajales and his brother **Julio Fabio Urdinola Grajales** head a major drug trafficking organization associated with the so-called **Northern Valle del Cauca** drug trafficking organizations.

The **Henao Montoya** brothers, **Arcangel de Jesus** and **Jose Orlando**, run trafficking operations out of the Northern Valle del Cauca region. The **Henao Montoyas** run the most powerful of the various independent trafficking groups that comprise the North Valle drug syndicate. The major North Valle drug syndicate organizations are poised to become among the most powerful drug trafficking groups in Colombia. The Henao Montoya organization has been closely linked to the paramilitary group run by **Carlos Castano,** a major cocaine trafficker in his own right.

Diego Montoya Sanchez heads a North Valle trafficking organization that transports cocaine base from Peru to Colombia and produces multi-ton quantities

of cocaine HCl for export to the United States and Europe. DEA considers **Montoya Sanchez** to be one of the most significant cocaine traffickers in Colombia today.

Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands are the United States' southern most points of entry, and as such, provide an excellent gateway for drugs destined for cities on the East Coast of the United States. More importantly, Puerto Rico's commonwealth status means that once a shipment of cocaine, whether smuggled by maritime, air or commercial cargo, reaches Puerto Rico, it may not be subjected to further United States Customs Service (USCS) inspection en route to the continental U.S. Puerto Rico' s 300-mile coastline, the vast number of isolated cays and 6 million square miles of open water between the U.S. and Colombia, make the region difficult to patrol and make it ideal for land, sea and air smuggling of drugs, weapons, illegal aliens and currency.

Puerto Rico is also a significant air and sea transportation port in the Caribbean for travelers destined for the United States. Puerto Rico has the third busiest seaport in North America and the 14th busiest in the world. The traffickers' biggest asset is the sheer volume of the commercial trade moving through the region. More than 75 daily commercial flights arrive daily in the United States from Puerto Rico. In January, 1998, the Caribbean Division arrested two American Airline employees who were employed at the Marin International Airport. DEA seized 200 kilograms of cocaine, $36,000 in U.S. currency and two loaded handguns.

Only 360 miles from Colombia' s north coast and 80 miles from the East Coast of the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico is easily reachable by twin engine aircraft hauling payloads of 500 to 700 kilograms of cocaine. The "go-fast" boats make their round trip cocaine runs, to the southern coast of Puerto Rico, in less than a day. Today, cocaine and heroin traffickers from Colombia have transformed Puerto Rico into the largest staging area in the Caribbean for smuggling Colombian cocaine and heroin into the U.S. The rural areas in the central mountain range and the South Coast provide the bases of operation for the command and control functions of the Colombian syndicates.

DEA has identified the following organizations from Colombia that have established a significant presence on the island of Puerto Rico. The "cell" managers of these organizations coordinate and monitor the flow of cocaine and heroin through the Caribbean Corridor, with the final destination being the United States.

Transportation groups in Puerto Rico utilize a variety of methods to move cocaine from Puerto Rico to the mainland. Smuggling groups take advantage of the fact that cargo and baggage leaving Puerto Rico for the United States is not subject to mandatory USCS inspection. One frequently used method is to ship cocaine via commercial aircraft, concealed either in cargo or personal baggage. Baggage handlers easily load unmanifested cargo or unaccompanied baggage onto aircraft, bound for Miami, New York, and a variety of other destinations. The cargo is ultimately off-loaded by complicit airline employees in destination cities. Containerized cargo leaving Puerto Rico via commercial freighter with sophisticated concealed compartments provides transportation groups a method to move 500 to multi-thousand kilograms of cocaine per shipment with relative low risk. Without specific intelligence, the sheer volume of the commercial shipments and freighter traffic makes interdiction extremely difficult. The sophistication and compartmentalization of these groups lead law enforcement to rely upon the interception of criminal communications to provide critical information on specific drug shipments.

In previous testimony, DEA has identified **Alberto Orlando-Gamboa**, **Celeste Santana**, and **Angela Ayala-Martinez**, as being major trafficking groups operating throughout Puerto Rico. Through a combined effort, DEA, FBI, and the USCS have successfully targeted these networks.

Alberto Orlando-Gamboa, who is closely associated with the Urdinola-Grajales family and other major Colombian North Coast traffickers, controls his organization from Colombia and is responsible for the distribution of thousands of kilograms of cocaine in New York and New Jersey. Using multiple transportation groups to smuggle cocaine into Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic, Orlandez-Gamboa conceals cocaine inside shipping containers of fruits and vegetables being shipped to ports in the United States. In March, 1997, principal

members of this organization were arrested. Over 600 kilograms of cocaine and $3 million in assets have been seized from Gamboa's cell managers in Puerto Rico.

Celeste Santana for the last two years has controlled a transportation group that uses a cadre of criminals employed at the Luis Munoz Marin International Airport in Puerto Rico to smuggle cocaine from Puerto Rico to New York. Members of Santana's organization, employed as food service workers, baggage handlers and maintenance workers, would transfer cocaine to Santana's couriers boarding U.S. bound flights. This organization has been responsible for transporting more than 3,000 kilograms of cocaine to New York utilizing this method. In 1997, DEA arrested seven members of this organization, and seized weapons and $30,000 in U. S. currency. In addition, 51 kilograms of cocaine were seized at the Marin International Airport in Puerto Rico.

Angela Ayala-Martinez runs what is widely considered the most active poly-drug trafficking organization in Puerto Rico and virtually controls the cocaine and heroin trafficking in the city of Ponce. In May, 1997, the DEA Ponce Office, arrested 21 members of this organization. Follow up investigation resulted in an additional 44 members of this organization being indicted and later arrested. This organization has been responsible for at least 40 drug-related homicides and is considered one of the most violent organizations operating in Puerto Rico.

The Role of the Dominican Republic

In the past, the Dominicans' role in illegal drug activity was limited to being "pick up crews" and couriers who assisted the Puerto Rican smugglers in their drug smuggling ventures. Much of this has changed with the evolution of the drug trade over the last three years. This new breed of Dominican trafficker functions as smuggler, transporter, and wholesaler in many U.S. cities on the East Coast. Smugglers from the Dominican Republic have gained a notorious reputation for their disregard of human life. They have been known to use a horrific diversionary tactic of throwing illegal aliens overboard from a drug-carrying boat to evade a pending U.S. Coast Guard boarding, knowing that the USCG will halt their pursuit to rescue those thrown overboard.

Dominican transportation groups frequently utilize wooden hulled boats with center consoles as their vessel of choice for smuggling operations. These "yolas" are low profile which enhances the traffickers' ability to thwart radar. These boats have also been retrofitted with plastic fuel tanks in order to extend their range. Boat crews rely on cellular telephone communications rather than high frequency radios to further enhance their security.

Trafficking groups continue to use "go-fast" boats, fishing vessels and pleasure craft to enhance their transportation capabilities. The speed of the "go-fast" boats greatly assists the traffickers in evading law enforcement. The other vessel types are less attractive due to slow speed, although they do have the advantage of easily concealing themselves among the other legitimate vessel traffic in the region.

In the last year, criminals from the Dominican Republic have emerged as the dominant force in the mid-level cocaine and heroin trade on the East Coast of the U.S. Many new Colombian drug syndicates have sought to pull back from the Cali syndicate's traditional modus operandi of ruling a monolithic organization by exercising complete control of the drug continuum: from the cultivation and production to wholesale marketing of both heroin and cocaine. Instead, they have chosen to franchise a significant portion of their heroin and cocaine wholesale operations. The Dominican trafficking groups, already firmly entrenched as low-level cocaine and heroin wholesalers in the larger Northeastern cities, were uniquely placed to assume a far more significant role in this multi-billion dollar business.

Trust is the essential ingredient in forging a successful business relationship in the drug underworld. It had already been established between Dominican and Colombian traffickers through relationships formed during hundreds of smuggling ventures in the Caribbean and through their long established relationships in New York, Newark, and Boston. Dominican groups are now a major force all along the drug trade spectrum in major East Coast cities. From Boston, Massachusetts to Charlotte, North Carolina, well organized Dominican trafficking groups are controlling and directing the sale of multi-hundred kilogram shipments of cocaine and multi-kilogram quantities of heroin for the first time. Their influence, however, has spread beyond the big city landscape into the smaller cities and towns along the East Coast.

New England is overwhelmed with Dominican groups selling multiple kilogram lots of cocaine and smaller amounts of heroin. For example, DEA and the Hartford Connecticut Police Department recently arrested 40 members of a Dominican trafficking group responsible for the retail sale of thousands of heroin bags brought into Hartford from New York City. In New Haven, Connecticut, one Dominican trafficking group was responsible for about 90% of all the heroin being sold in the area.

In Concord, New Hampshire, two investigations by DEA and state and local agencies resulted in the arrest of 64 members of a Dominican-controlled crack cocaine distribution organization. These investigations revealed that one Dominican organization moved to the remote area of Georgia, Vermont and established a cocaine distribution network that had ties to another Dominican organization in Syracuse, New York. Local departments throughout the Northeast report that Dominican traffickers are moving into towns of 60,000 to 70,000 people, inundating them with heroin and cocaine. They are also participating in a variety of other crimes ranging from robbery to muggings, virtually creating their own crime wave.

This change is not unique to New England. The Philadelphia area is saturated with Dominican traffickers looking to claim a larger portion of that market, and the Washington-Baltimore area routinely receives heroin shipments from New York - based Dominican groups. In July, 1997, a group of Dominican traffickers were arrested in Charlotte, North Carolina, after an investigation revealed they were transporting heroin from New York City to supply guests at private rave parties in the Charlotte area.

Haiti: Drug trafficking Crossroads of the Caribbean

Haiti is strategically located in the Central Caribbean, occupying the Western half of the island of Hispaniola, which it shares with the Dominican Republic. At 27,750 square kilometers, the country is slightly larger than the state of Maryland. With the Caribbean to the south, and the open Atlantic Ocean to the north, Haiti is in an ideal position to facilitate the movement of cocaine and heroin from Colombia to the U.S. The Port-Au-Prince Country office in Haiti and the Santo Domingo Country Office in the Dominican Republic represent DEA on the island

of Hispaniola. Just 80 miles from the East Coast of Hispaniola, Puerto Rico is easily accessible by plane or boat.

The island of Hispaniola is just under 430 miles from Colombia' s most northern point, and easily accessible by twin engine aircraft hauling payloads of 500 to 700 kilos of cocaine. While smuggling drugs by sea is primarily accomplished by concealment in commercial shipments, to Hispaniola, ocean-going "go-fast" boats can make their cocaine runs to the Southern Coast of Haiti and return, in less than a day. The two countries on the island, Haiti and the Dominican Republic, share similar coastal features, facilitating inter-island boat traffic.

As the case with the Dominican Republic, Haiti presents an ideal location for staging and the transshipment of drugs. There is effectively no border control between the two countries, allowing essentially unimpeded traffic back and forth. The vast amount of the South American drug traffic, which arrives in Haiti, is transported across the porous border with the Dominican Republic, and then on to Puerto Rico by Dominican transportation groups. Once the heroin and cocaine reach the Dominican Republic, Dominican groups take control over both smuggling the drugs into the U.S. and carrying out an increasing percentage of wholesale and some retail distribution along the East Coast. The Haitians have made some significant seizures recently, however, to have a maximum impact, it is critical that these seizures be used as the linchpin to build cases against key Colombian and Haitian traffickers. Once the DEA office in Port-au-Prince is fully staffed, we will continue to work closely with the Haitian National Police to build strong prosecutable cases against these traffickers.

The easy access to the Dominican Republic, and the lack of an effective legal system, has allowed Haiti to become a key link in the transportation chain. Today, cocaine and heroin traffickers from Colombia have enlisted the aid of traffickers and smugglers from the Dominican Republic to deliver their product to market and have placed an entire command and control infrastructure in the Caribbean, including Haiti, to manage the movement of cocaine throughout the Caribbean Corridor.

DEA has identified the following major Colombian organizations that are based in Haiti. In addition, several Haitian "splinter" groups with direct ties to Colombia, have also been identified.

Fernando Alfonso Burgos-Martinez, a Colombian national, is the primary cocaine facilitator in Haiti. He controls an organization that manages the movement of approximately 1,000 kilograms of cocaine per month. Burgos-Martinez uses his "legitimate" businesses in Haiti and the Dominican Republic as fronts to cover his drug trafficking activities. Burgos-Martinez tied to North Coast Colombian traffickers, was indicted on January 15, 1997, in the Southern District of Florida, for cocaine trafficking. Although several members of his organization have been arrested, Burgos-Martinez has not yet been apprehended.

Beaudouin Ketant, a Haitian national, has organized a broad transportation and distribution network that smuggles cocaine into the United States, through Fort Lauderdale, Miami, West Palm Beach, New York, and Chicago, utilizing a cadre of couriers travelling by commercial aircraft and vessel. To facilitate the entry of drugs into the United States, Ketant's organization has corrupted personnel at the Miami and JFK international airports. Ketant then has the smuggling proceeds laundered through front companies and repatriated back to Haiti. Ketant is also believed to be linked to Burgos-Martinez.

Fritz Charles Saint Hubert (a.k.a. Mona St. Hubert), a Haitian national, and his brother **Ives Saint Hubert** smuggle cocaine from Haiti to the United States. Both have ties to Colombian traffickers, including Burgos-Martinez.

The Lure of the Bahamas

The Bahamian Island chain, which lies Northwest of the island of Hispaniola and just Northeast of Cuba, has been a center for smuggling contraband for centuries. During the heyday of the Medellin Cartel, Carlos Lehder bought an entire island, Norman' s Cay, where he flew planes laden with hundreds of kilos of cocaine to stage for entry into the United States.

The Bahamas remains a central conduit for air and maritime shipments of drugs moving through the Western and Central Caribbean to the Southeast United

States. Two recent maritime operations, resulting in the seizure of 4.3 metric tons of cocaine, are indicative of the Colombian drug lords' return to the Caribbean. On February 20, 1998, the Honduran vessel *Nicole* departed Barranquilla, Colombia en route to Turks and Caicos Islands. DEA confirmed that this vessel was originally named the *Lucent Star* and had been involved with the off-loading of multi-thousand kilograms of cocaine, off the coast of Haiti, in 1997. The subsequent search of the vessel uncovered approximately 3,700 kilograms of cocaine. DEA also developed intelligence that the Panamanian vessel *Sea Star II* was suspected of smuggling multi-thousand kilograms of cocaine. On February 28, 1998, this vessel docked in Freeport, Grand Bahama. The search of the vessel uncovered approximately 2000 kilograms of cocaine.

Transportation groups located in the Bahamas utilize a variety of methods to move cocaine from the islands to the United States. Colombian traffickers air drop shipments of cocaine off the coast of Jamaica, or utilize boat to boat transfers on open seas. Jamaican and Bahamian transportation groups then use Jamaican canoes to smuggle their payloads into the Bahama chain, frequently using the territorial waters of Cuba to shield their movements. The cocaine is then transferred to pleasure craft which disappear into the inter-island boat traffic. Traffickers also use twin-engine turbo-prop aircraft, with long range capability and Global Positioning Systems, which pinpoint drop zones and meeting spots in the middle of the ocean. Cellular telephones are used to minimize their exposure to interdiction assets and ensure the smooth transfer of their cargo of cocaine for shipment onto the United States.

DEA is very concerned about the new containerized shipping port facility in Freeport, Bahamas, which will function as a freight-forwarding point for commercial cargo being sent to various ports in the United States and Europe. The containers are not to be opened while in Freeport, however, this creates a situation ripe for opportunistic smuggling organizations to exploit. Even more disturbing are current plans to make Freeport a free zone, which will allow cargo legitimately shipped through the port to be opened and merchandise to be removed or added while in port. Miami's port of entry, which handles hundreds of thousands of tons of commercial cargo, both through Miami International Airport and the seaport, is ideal for smuggling large shipments of cocaine into the United States. Tramp freighters, by the hundred, tour the Caribbean, going island to island, picking up and dropping off cargo. It is relatively simple for captains, with

the inclination, to stop mid-ocean and take on hundreds of kilograms of cocaine and conceal them in false compartments or take on commercial cargo at ports of call with cocaine already concealed inside.

Once the cocaine arrives in Miami, the Colombian traffickers have a two decade old transportation infrastructure, who work at the air and seaports, to facilitate the off-loading and warehousing of cocaine shipments. These traffickers frequently provide transportation via tractor trailer or private vehicle to Colombian cell heads on the East Coast and in the Midwest.

To counter the threat in the Northern Caribbean, the United States government initiated Operation Bahamas and Turks and Caicos (OPBAT) in 1982. This joint interdication operation comprised of Bahamian law enforcement, DEA, USCS, U.S. Coast Guard and Department of Defense is headquartered in Nassau, Bahamas. OPBAT has had enormous success over the years, seizing thousands of kilograms of cocaine and literally driving the transportation groups working for he Cali syndicate out of the Northern Caribbean.

A Hemispheric Law Enforcement Response

Over time, law enforcement in the U.S. has been able to counter organized crime effectively, by attacking the command and control systems of the syndicates through the use of court approved intercepts. Successful cases against the leaders of international drug trafficking groups most often originate from investigations being conducted in the United States. Through what was originally designated our Southwest Border Initiative, but has become a strategy employed throughout the hemisphere, DEA and our counterparts direct their resources against the communications systems of the command and control functions of the organized crime groups in both the Caribbean and South America. DEA's enforcement operations in these efforts rely heavily on court-authorized electronic surveillance interception orders.

In response to the threat posed in the Caribbean, DEA has enhanced the Caribbean Field Division by 25 Special Agents. In fiscal year 1997, the Caribbean Division arrested 652 defendants, initiated 124 criminal cases and documented over $13 million in asset seizures. In July, 1997, to disrupt the flow of drug traffic

in the Caribbean, DEA initiated Operation Summer Storm and Operation Blue Skies. Both operations are coordinated with Caribbean law enforcement personnel and target air, land, and maritime smuggling networks. In April, 1998, Operation Frontier Lance will focus investigative resources on air and maritime smuggling throughout the Southern and Northern areas of Hispaniola in order to reduce the flow of traffic through Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

A successful counterdrug strategy must incorporate an interdiction component that receives critical, actionable intelligence which is necessary to be successful. The vastness of the Caribbean Corridor combined with the traffickers' use of sophisticated hidden compartments in freighters, along with the sheer volume and variety of commercial cargo flowing through the Caribbean, make a meaningful interdiction program almost completely dependent on quality intelligence. Our hemispheric strategy relies upon court-ordered electronic surveillance that allows us to support interdiction agencies with quality intelligence. Over time, this strategy impairs a criminal organization' s ability to conduct business, leaving it even more vulnerable to law enforcement strategies.

Conclusion

DEA remains committed to our primary goal of targeting and arresting the most significant drug traffickers operating in the world today. In order to meet this goal, it is essential that we have trustworthy and competent agencies in the Caribbean, Mexico, Central and South America working side by side with us. With the assistance of our state and local partners domestically and our counterparts in foreign governments, DEA will continue to build cases against, and ultimately incarcerate, the leaders of these sophisticated criminal syndicates that continue to distribute their poison throughout the world.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, Mr. Chairman. I will be happy to respond to any questions you or the members of the Subcommittee may have.

Mr. HASTERT. Thank you, Mr. Marshall.

I know Admiral Kramek you have to leave shortly, so let me start with the questions in your direction here.

We've seen, since 1993, a drop in appropriations to your agency, and a drop in appropriations means a lack of resources or a dip in resources. What is the comparison of resources that you have in interdiction area today, as opposed to 1993?

Admiral KRAMEK. Overall, we now have approximately two-thirds of the resources, and about 50 percent of the shipdays, and less than 50 percent of the flight hours available than we had back in 1991–1992, entering 1993 timeframe.

Mr. HASTERT. So what percentage of the overall drug budget was interdiction in 1992, 1993 and what is it today?

Admiral KRAMEK. The percentage of the drug budget interdiction today is approximately 11 percent. Back then it was closer to 17–18 percent.

Mr. HASTERT. You have some charts, I know, some you can show and some you can't, but, actually, you have areas in the Pacific and in the Caribbean that you have targets and you have programs to focus in on that. Do you have all the assets that you need to man those areas?

Admiral KRAMEK. We cannot presently cover the threat in the Eastern Caribbean. We can only cover the threat in the vicinity of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, the Jamaica-Haiti gap. In a surge operation, we started on or about the first of March for about 3 months, we'll surge there. But, there's not sufficient resources to sustain that operation like we did with Frontier Shield, and our sustaining that. We have insufficient resources in the Eastern Pacific to stop that threat. General Wilhelm mentioned Operation Caper Focus. North of that is a JIATF-WEST operation run out of PACOM called Pacific Trident. And, neither one of those are resourced adequately to stop the threat.

Mr. HASTERT. In the past, you've had aircraft, such as E–2's, P–3's, C–130's, and AWACS. Do you have an adequate amount of that type of aircraft to spot drug traffickers and drug traffic?

Admiral KRAMEK. We don't and it's really not a matter of funds. It's a matter of what's happening in the world, and what's happened in the world in the change of our Global National Security Policy from 1989 to today. In that our armed forces, including the Coast Guard, have been reduced in size by as much as 35 percent. Instead of over 500 Navy ships, there's less than 350. The Coast Guard is the smallest it's been since 1965. Our uniformed personnel are smaller than the New York City police department. We have less ships, less planes, less people and, so, we're just not able to have assets to put on those threat vectors right now.

Mr. HASTERT. Do you have a chart that you would like to show with that?

Admiral KRAMEK. That chart appears in the GAO report that you referenced. Jim will you put up the money chart first—the Resource?

[Chart shown.]

Admiral KRAMEK. This appears in the report made to you, Mr. Chairman, but I think it's illustrative of exactly what you're referring to. This shows from 1991 to 1998 the amount of money spent

on counternarcotics funding in the transit zone. Approximately $1 billion in 1991 and 1992, and then it went progressively downward until 1996 where it's now made an increase in the last 2 years as both the administration and Congress have decided that this problem is serious, and so we're on our way back.

Mr. HASTERT. I observe under your line that the expenditures for your efforts are about half of what they were in 1990.

Admiral KRAMEK. About two-thirds. That's right, sir.

Mr. HASTERT. 1991, I'm looking at. Right.

Yes, I just visited Central—the Southern Command headquarters in Tucson, AZ, one of the Air Force headquarters, and visited Davis-Monthan Air Force Base. In that, there were scores of P–3's sitting there with radar capability. Why can't we use that aircraft in this effort?

Admiral KRAMEK. I think the reason is that the—a good example is our current defense budget and while I'm in the Department of Transportation, it's common knowledge that—but I am a member of the armed forces and I meet with the CINC's and service chiefs. All the resources available are just barely adequate. In fact, short of being adequate to cover two military contingencies almost simultaneously. That's why there are supplementals up here in Congress now for operations other than war which weren't scheduled, such as Bosnia, such as what's going on in Iraq. And, you can recall a couple of years ago before this committee, when we were faced with this huge threat in the drug war, the administration requested a supplemental as well.

The current resources resulting from our downsizing are just not adequate. I would assume that those aircraft are either allocated to other missions or there is insufficient money to operate them with the current budget.

Mr. HASTERT. They're sitting in the desert not allocated to anything.

Admiral KRAMEK. There isn't sufficient money to operate them then.

Mr. HASTERT. In final question—I'll give anybody else a chance to question you, if they wish. I know we have men and women in Bosnia that are serving their country and trying to keep peace in the Balkans. We have men and women in Saudi Arabia, in Turkey. They're serving their country and trying to keep peace, and people with mass destructions at bay in Iraq. But, we also see 10, or 14, or 20,000 of our citizens, most of them kids, depending on how you count and how you include gangs and gang violence and drug-related crimes, dying on our street corners. It's a sad situation that we don't have the resources to protect our kids. But, we spread those resources over the world.

I understand the responsibility that we have as a world peacekeeper, but we are losing our citizens. We are losing our kids. And, I can tell you, if we lost 10,000 young men and women in the Middle East, this country would be up in arms. But, we've lost more than that every year inside our shores because of deaths that have come from offshore. I think it's time to refocus what we spend our defense dollars on, and if we need to increase those defense dollars to protect our interests at home, we need to do that. I'm preaching to the choir, but I think that's a very, very important issue. Admi-

ral before I turn over my questions to someone else, I want to ask you one other thing. We've heard a lot from DEA and others about all the Caribbean islands. Not once did I hear Cuba mentioned.

Admiral KRAMEK. Cuba presents an interesting dilemma for the United States, that you're well familiar with, in that we have economic sanctions against that nation, and we follow the guidance and the Helms-Burton legislation passed by Congress. I have relationships with Cuba.

As you know, in fact, within the last 2 hours, we have an operation right off the coast of Miami where 16 to 20 Cuban migrants have just tried to reach Florida. And with the bad weather that's down there now, their boat has capsized. They're in the water. Two of them are dead. Another one is dying from hypothermia, and we're involved in trying to rescue the rest. Those that are picked up will probably be repatriated to Cuba as economic migrants. So, we have relations with Cuba to do that. We also have relations with Cuba, and I have telexes with their Border Guards for search and rescue when that's necessary.

However, we don't have a cooperative agreement with Cuba for counternarcotics. It's something, perhaps, we can consider. I would tell you that approximately 2 years ago when I thought it was essential that we shut down the air routes over Cuba, the international air routes, which our airlines paid millions of dollars to traverse on their way back and forth to South America. Drug traffickers use those air corridors at will. Right when we were getting ready, as a Nation, to do that, the Cubans shot down the Brothers to the Rescue aircraft and indicated that they were not very responsible as a nation. Perhaps things have changed, and we should discuss with them shutting down those air routes to traffickers, because there's quite a bit of drug trafficking across Cuba. But, for the moment, Cuba is not part of the Caribbean regional plan in counternarcotics.

Mr. HASTERT. So, are you saying there's no implication that Cuba is involved in trafficking narcotics?

Admiral KRAMEK. Cuba is not trafficking narcotics. Cuba is used as a transiting country only in the sense that the traffickers go over Cuba, or around Cuba, or land in Cuba's territorial waters. They get no assistance from the Cubans, but a very, very common method of smuggling is to fly over Cuba with 1,000 kilos of cocaine, go through the international air corridors, drop the cocaine within Cuban territorial seas on the north side of Cuba, and then go-fast boats come down from the Bahamas to pick up the drugs. We are unable to enter Cuban territorial seas or air space by our present agreements and treaties and, therefore, not able to stop the smugglers when they use that route.

Recently, a vessel that we did chase down in those waters called the *Limerick* tried to scuttle itself, drifted into Cuban waters. The Cubans did board that; 6,000 or 7,000 pounds of cocaine was discovered and, I believe then, and Donnie could probably shed more light on this, the Cubans did come to Miami, did testify in the trial against those smugglers. And, that was the first instance in many years that we've cooperated together in a counternarcotics operation.

Mr. HASTERT. Admiral, if you had your wish list, what do you need to do your job in the Eastern Pacific, and in the Caribbean?

Admiral KRAMEK. Well, we need the resources necessary to match the threats that are there. But, again, I said that it's more than, I think, money and funding. I think it's ship hulls and it's maritime patrol aircraft.

The command and control system is there. Charlie has that in hand. He knows what to do. We know what the threat is. There don't appear to be enough assets in the inventory of the armed forces or the law enforcement agencies. And, I would point out, this is a two-stage operation. Two-stage operation from the standpoint that interdiction in the transit zone has four steps: detection and monitoring, which General Wilhelm is, primarily, responsible for and focused on with his command and control organizations and his forces, and then intercept and apprehension. He does a lot of intercepting, too, but in that intercept phase, there's a passoff to law enforcement agencies, because this constitutes an "end game" by law enforcement, and that ends up with DEA, Customs, Coast Guard, FBI, and that's why we are all together in these joint interagency task forces, because our Armed Forces are not allowed to conduct law enforcement.

So that's why we work so closely together, but combined, we don't have the right mix or adequate resources, now, for every threat arrow. We no longer have defense in-depth. We just have the ability to do flexible, sector response.

Mr. HASTERT. Now, one of the things, last year, we had a group of young men who were under your command who came and testified about their experiences boarding ships and trying to stop the narcotrafficking through the Caribbean. I think it was, specifically, the Caribbean. They talked about the shortage of forward-looking radar, of FLIRS, the infrared goggles, those types of things. Do you have in your inventory enough of that type of equipment that's just the equipment that your men need? Do you have an adequate supply?

Admiral KRAMEK. As a result of the actions of this committee, Chairman Rogers' committee, Chairman Wolf's committee, and others, Chairman McCollum's committee, this last year in the 1998 budget, we revived with sufficient funds to put forward-looking infrareds and the appropriate radars on our C–130's. What's also represented in this budget, is about a 9 percent increase in the technological portion of the Coast Guard's budget in counterdrugs to improve our detection capability with our existing aircraft.

Mr. HASTERT. When you got that equipment, your C–130's—do you have all the C–130's to your—in service now——

Admiral KRAMEK. I have all the——

Mr. HASTERT [continuing]. Or did you lose some?

Admiral KRAMEK [continuing]. The C–130's I'm authorized to have right now.

Mr. HASTERT. So, what does that mean, Admiral?

Admiral KRAMEK. I have 32 C–130's authorized for the missions I have, and I'm not authorized to have any more than that.

Mr. HASTERT. What did you have last year?

Admiral KRAMEK. I had the same number last year.

Mr. HASTERT. So, you haven't lost any?

Admiral KRAMEK. No.

Mr. HASTERT. OK.

I know you have to leave at 2:10 p.m. It's 2:10 p.m. We're going to excuse you.

Admiral KRAMEK. I have a Senate hearing, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HASTERT. The Senate's pretty important. The other body is pretty important, so we'll let you go. [Laughter.]

Admiral KRAMEK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HASTERT. Thank you. General, again, appreciate you being here today, and certainly, the work that you've done in trying to coordinate the whole Southern Command, which is a big job.

What do you see as the biggest threat? And, let me preface this for a second. You heard what I said about drugs, and our kids, and how I feel about this. You know, 16 years ago, I wasn't a politician. I was a history teacher. And, when you studied the wars, and the generals, and the threats to this country—you know, during World War II, when Nazi Germany and Japan threatened this country, once we had the resources to be able to attack those countries, we did that. We attacked them at the very heart of their warmaking capabilities, and we had to fight them man-to-man, but the air power, and the attack was one of the keys that will cut it off. So, we cutoff the source of supply of the weapons that they could make war with, and that was, eventually, the victory.

When we looked at the last two wars that we were involved, in Korea and at Vietnam, it was difficult to be able to do that. You couldn't tell where the supply lines were. The areas that the weapons actually came from, came from outside the borders of those countries and the constraints of war. And, almost, in a sense, a frustrating sense, as Yogi Berra would say "It's deja vu all over again" when we're trying to fight this drug war, because we do have some constraints on what we can do. We can't go out and bomb the upper Huallaga Valley or send troops into Colombia. So, what are the threats, and what can we do, and what is in the realm of the doable, so we can win this war?

General WILHELM. Sir, the threat, of course, as you know, and the many members of the committee know well, it's very pervasive, but what does it really threaten? In my opening statement, I made the comment, and I truly meant it. I do regard drugs as a weapon of mass destruction and, as you covered as well, our annual casualty count, our body count, right here in Detroit, and Miami, and New York, and Chicago, tells us it's a lethal threat to the United States, and it's been declared a threat to our national security.

Beyond that, it's a cancer that threatens the whole hemisphere. We're living with a success story here right now. Of 35 nations in this hemisphere, 34 are functioning democracies. The issue is how do we sustain the progress that we've made since as recent as 14 in 1978, when most of Latin America was dictatorships. Probably, no single malady undermines these emerging democracies, right now, more than drugs. So, it affects us and it affects, of course, our neighbors to the south.

Your World War II analogy was a pretty good one, I think. I'm not sure that this threat is all that invisible. I think we can attack, and I think we can attack on multiple fronts. In World War II, we didn't take on Germany, and we didn't take on Japan, separately.

We took them on together. We conducted the first of, what we now know as, strategic bombing campaigns against their industrial base. We could see them. We could find them. We controlled the sea lines of communications in the Pacific and the Atlantic. And, finally, we projected power into the Pacific and across the Atlantic and on to the mainland of Europe.

I think there is a lesson of history that can be repeated there. We can see the fields of coca in Latin America if we go to a high enough altitude. We can find the poppy fields in Colombia. We know where the sea lines of communications are that the drugs are being transited over to bring them to the United States.

Finally, just as we did in the United States, I, as a little kid in North Carolina, can remember the little flashes of light out on the horizon off Nags Heads and the Capes down there, which were our ships burning. We defended the homeland.

So, the bottom line is, I really think we have to attack this problem everywhere that it exists. Here at home, in the transit zone, and in the source zone. The question is, in what proportions, at what locations, with how much vigor, at what time. And, as you stated, there's kind of a grim metric here, and it's the loss of our people. I think we're all committed to defeating this problem just as rapidly as we can.

Mr. HASTERT. Do you, in your mind, have the resources that you need to be effective in your region to do the job?

General WILHELM. Not entirely. No, sir. As you know, Southern Command, really has six primary functions in the counternarcotic area. We're responsible for intelligence. We're responsible for training with the nations in the hemisphere. We provide them with operational planning support. We provide them with logistical support. We provide them with command and control capabilities, and very importantly, the Department of Defense is the lead agency for detection, monitoring, and tracking.

We've got deficiencies. Bob Kramek covered a number of them in our detection, monitoring, and tracking capability. One exercise, or excuse me, one operation that we had to postpone was a very significant one. Back to Operation Caper Focus in the Eastern Pacific, I have estimates that, as much as, 220 metric tons moved through the Eastern Pacific.

Caper Focus was designed as a three-phase operation. Phase I was intelligence collection to learn exactly where the threatened movement vectors were. Phase II was to do an operational analysis of the traffickers' patterns. How are they moving the narcotics, and how are they getting it on to the Pacific Coast of Mexico. Then phase III was execution. We, I think, did a pretty good job on phases I and II. We found out where the routes were. We determined the operating patterns, but unfortunately, don't have the detection, monitoring, and tracking assets to give the ships the eyes that they need forward to identify the tracks so that we can execute Caper Focus. That's an awful lot of drugs moving into the East Coast of Mexico.

As Admiral Kramek mentioned, we pulse or surge in the Caribbean. My figures are maybe even a little more draconian than his. Looking at my entire area, the transit zone and the source zone, we cover less than 15 percent of the area, 15 percent of the time

with the assets that we have right now. We try to fight smart. We analyze our intelligence. We cue our assets based on intelligence. We analyze operating patterns, and we try to be at the right place at the right time, and our seizure rates show that we've done at least a respectable job in that regard. Though our assets have gone down, our seizure rates have gone up. But, do we need more detection, monitoring, and tracking assets to make the kind of difference we want to make? Yes, sir, we do.

Mr. HASTERT. So, basically, what you're telling me is you have a strategy. You know how to stop the threat in the Eastern Pacific where, approximately, probably, a quarter of the marijuana and cocaine that moves into our country comes through at this time, but you don't have the ships, and the resources, and the planes to stop it. So you have to sit and watch it happen.

General WILHELM. In a sense, sir, that's a very true statement. And, of course, we're caught on the horns of national dilemmas. There are other pressing needs overseas, and they draw off the Airborne Warning and Control System [AWACS]. They draw off the P–3's, and leave us in a position where we just don't have the detection, monitoring, and tracking capabilities that we need to succeed in the execution phase.

Mr. HASTERT. You've had to restructure your force to move your assets around, and where you were once stationed in Panama, now you're in Miami. And, you have troops and facilities in Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico has been somewhat of a success story. We've dropped from 20 percent to the cocaine coming to there to report, say, about 5 percent. What do you need in Puerto Rico and in Panama to get the job done?

General WILHELM. Sir, I'd like to, first, address Puerto Rico. What I need in Puerto Rico more than anything else, and perhaps, the most urgent item on the SOUTHCOM agenda today is a home for U.S. Army South. Under the provisions of the Panama Canal treaties, U.S. Army South must come out of its current home at Fort Clayton and Panama during 1999. In my judgment, there is one, and only one, correct strategic location for U.S. Army South, and that's in Puerto Rico.

Puerto Rico keeps one of my major component headquarters in the area of responsibility, and very importantly, I think, for every one of us who is responsible for superintending the limited resources at our disposal, it puts our very capable, active component Army planners on the same island with about 15,000 Army guardsmen, reservists, and members of the Air Force Guard, all of whom speak two languages, English and Spanish. So, as I commented to Governor Rosello, they're worth about 30,000 to me. What a great application of the total force.

Mr. HASTERT. So, why aren't we there?

General WILHELM. Well, there are some Military Construction [MILCON] issues, I think, to overcome. I have a meeting with Senator Stevens tomorrow. Hopefully, we can resolve that. And, beyond that, sir, there are, I believe, some minor, and I will use the term "minor," cost savings that could be achieved if U.S. Army South moved to bases in the continental United States.

My judgment is that we would pay a large strategic price for a very small fiscal gain by doing that.

Mr. HASTERT. What about Panama?

General WILHELM. Panama is kind of an enigma wrapped in a puzzle, right now, sir, based on the status of the negotiations. As you know, we've really been working very, very hard with Panama since about last September to reach agreement on the correct form and structure for a multinational counterdrug center [MCC] in Panama, which would, notionally, be based at the, what we now know as, Howard Air Force Base. As recently as Christmas Eve, talking with Ambassador Ted McNamara, our senior Ambassador, sir, I thought on Christmas Day we would be drawing up the MCC.

The Government of Panama has changed its requirements and its negotiating strategy, and recently changed out its entire negotiating team. So, that situation is very much in doubt right now. A glance at the map tells you how strategically significant Panama is, a secure location staring right down the barrel into the Andean Ridge, and into all of the nations of South America; well-developed United States facilities, an ideal location for us to really get our arms around a multinational, multilateral approach to the drug problem.

Mr. HASTERT. What about Colombia? Colombia, we have heard reports, as late as last week, that there were severe losses, that their Army is in battles with the narcoguerrillas, people who were once the FARC and the ELN that were supplied by leftist governments because they were philosophical-based. Today, that's not so. They're into the narcotics business big time, and not only serve as the guards and the facilitators who are—narcotics moving in and out of that area and the manufacturing, but they also are part of the business itself.

What's going on? What do we have to do there to stabilize that country? And, there is a country, in my opinion and I'd like to get your view, that's really at risk, a democracy at risk.

General WILHELM. Congressman Hastert, I concur with that assessment. I, too, believe, that Colombia is very much at risk.

The results of the last week—the activities of the last week, are grim. I talked on the phone to General Bonett, the chief of the Colombian Armed Forces just yesterday. I'm leaving, Sunday, to go down and see him, and we're going to talk a little bit about the way ahead. The statistics are bad, right now, based on the reporting I have. They had 58 killed, 27 captured, 29 missing, and only 44 recovered from two companies who engaged the FARC near a place called El Billar in Caqueta, which is one of the regions where coca cultivation has increased, really, geometrically over the last year or two.

We have a long way to go with their Armed Forces. They've got a lot of needs. Mobility is an enormous problem for them, particularly, in the outlying departments of Colombia. I had my guys do just a quick study of the road networks in Colombia. Our road network per square mile in the United States is 35 times denser than Colombia.

I know you've been there, sir. You've seen it. You either get there through the air, or on the rivers, or you don't get there. That's part of the problem that they had in trying to reinforce the two companies that were engaged by the FARC.

I think we took a step in the right direction a couple of weeks ago when the decision was made to grant Colombia a national interest waiver under the certification process. Without that waiver, I am very, severely limited in what I can do at Southern Command in assisting them with things like training, organizing, and really, updating the doctrine of their forces. It limits what we can do under the International Military Education and Training Program. It limits foreign military sales that essentially make null and void our opportunities for foreign military financing.

I think we have a lot of work to do with them. We need to look at their training. We need to look at their tactics. We need to look at the way they integrate intelligence into their operations. All of that will be mainstream business when I sit down with General Bonett next week in Bogota. We'll also go to Tres Esquinas, and take a look at the situation on the ground there.

Mr. HASTERT. General, we've talked about Colombia. We've talked about the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific. The fact is that almost all, or 65 percent to 70 percent of all, the drugs that come in this country, come across our Southern border. And, the efforts, even the—all the shipments along the Eastern Pacific end up in Mexico, then cross our borders. Is it my understanding that you do not have the responsibility for Mexico? Is that right?

General WILHELM. Sir, that's correct. I have certain limited responsibilities with Mexico. We have the portfolio for security assistance for Mexico, and very recently, we augmented the Intelligence Analysis Center, which is focused very heavily on the flow of counterdrug information with Mexico.

Mr. HASTERT. Who does have the military responsibility for the relationship between Mexico and this country?

General WILHELM. Under the Unified Command Plan, sir, Mexico is not assigned which, essentially, makes it the responsibility of Washington, for lack of a better word. I have talked with——

Mr. HASTERT. Washington is a big place.

General WILHELM. Washington is a big place. Yes, sir. So, it's pretty much administered out of the Pentagon and out of the State Department, sir.

Mr. HASTERT. Thank you. I'll yield at this time to the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Barrett.

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm sorry that I missed part of the testimony. It would be helpful for me as we talked a little bit earlier about the changes and the direction of where drugs are coming from. How you attribute the changes, for example, in Puerto Rico. Why we're seeing the changes in Puerto Rico with drugs coming through there, what you attribute that to?

Mr. MARSHALL. I'll try to respond to that, sir.

I think, as I mentioned in my statement, law enforcement successes, such as Operation BAT, and these were interagency operations back during the "hey day" of the Medellin Cartel in the mid- and late eighties. I think that those operations had some success and played some role in moving the traffic westward to Mexico. What may have played a more significant role, however, was the dismantling of the Medellin Cartel and the significant progress that we have made in taking down the command and control structure of the Cali Cartel. I think that once we upset the secure and

traditional ways that the Cali Cartel did business, they had to turn in some other direction, and they turned to Mexico. And, they've done that for a number of years, and that's still the primary threat in my opinion with regard to Colombian cocaine and several other things as well.

What, I think, we may be seeing now, although it is still not totally definitive, I think, we may be seeing a little bit of a return to the Caribbean, primarily because the Mexican-trafficking groups have begun charging 50 percent of an actual load of drugs for their transportation of that load of drugs. That diminishes, somewhat the Colombians' profits. I think that the Colombians, for that reason, have tried to exploit opportunities in the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Puerto Rico, and perhaps, we are seeing a bit of an increase in a return to their traditional routes, which for many, many years, they were very comfortable with. So, that's how I would attribute the changes that we're seeing.

Mr. BARRETT. I know that the chairman has touched a lot on resources, but if we're going to be giving you additional resources, where exactly would you want them? Help me understand that, General.

General WILHELM. OK, sir. I suspect that Mr. Marshall. I'll take it and, perhaps, Donnie would like to fill in back of me, sir.

I, really, think there are, probably, three areas that I would mention. First, and in answer to a previous question while you were voting, sir, I mentioned our deficiencies in carrying out our detection, monitoring, and tracking functions. Those are principally the aircraft that we use to establish and maintain track data in both the transit and the source zones. And, of course, those are also the assets that really provide the guidance which is, subsequently, used by the host nation for endgame, when they actually engage the airplanes.

Mr. BARRETT. What type of aircraft are you referring to there, specifically?

General WILHELM. Narcotrafficking aircraft, sir. If we're talking about the airbridge over Peru and Colombia. In addition to what those assets do in the source zone, they also provide the cueing information that our ships need to cover the transit routes in both the Eastern Pacific and in the Caribbean.

Again, we're very, very thin. For example, we are supposed to have by the counterdrug execute order, a total of two AWACS at all times. One of those we get from the U.S. Pacific Command, and one we get from the U.S. Atlantic Command.

The Pacific Command AWACS we, normally, assign to cover the source zone, principally, the Colombia-Peru airbridge. The asset that we get from ACOM, we frequently use, primarily, in the transit zone. Because of the situation in Iraq, our second AWACS was drawn off and has been supporting Central Command there. So, that creates a very, significant hole in our detection, monitoring, and tracking capabilities, and one that is very difficult for us to fill.

In the last year, we've sustained a 36 percent reduction in the total number of P–3 operating hours from the Navy that are available to us. That's very hard for us to replace. The total number of tracker aircraft, which are primarily provided to us by the U.S. Customs Service, but are heavily funded by the Department of De-

fense, has been cut, roughly, in half. We have two out of five operating ground-based radars that are supporting us right now down range. The others are being commercialized, but we've been reduced there. So, detection, monitoring, and tracking is a major need.

Second, sir, I think we would profit enormously in trying to cultivate a multinational, multilateral approach to this if we all had a common operating picture. Everyone in the Caribbean, everyone in the source zone starts to eliminate some of these seams and boundaries that the narcotraffickers exploit.

We do have a counternarcotics command management system. We have an Andean Ridge radar network which links our radars, but we don't have anything that, really, draws it all together on one screen where everybody's seeing the same thing. That would be a tremendous gain for us.

Finally, sir, I guess just sort of looking at the here and how, now are things today, we really need to sustain the progress that we've made and to try to increase our effectiveness in some of the areas that we are not covering right now. We, at least, need to sustain operations at the same level that we did in 1997, and our current funding will make that difficult.

Bob Kramek talked about having about 11 percent of the national counternarcotics budget to do his business as the Interdiction Coordinator. Southern Command has 1 percent, $155 million this year to do our business down range.

Mr. BARRETT. Mr. Marshall.

Mr. MARSHALL. Congressman, I think, I have to set a little bit of a framework for my answer, and I will get to the answer, what I think what we need, and where we would put those resources. But, in order to get there, I think that I need to point out that the drug-trafficking organizations, really, don't recognize international boundaries. They operate along a seamless continuum, and we have to recognize in the business that decisions that are made in Cali, Colombia, or Guadalajara, Mexico, or Southeast Asia have a direct effect on what goes on with regards to drug trafficking and drug-related violence on the streets of the United States in such unlikely places as Des Moines, IA, Rocky Mount, NC, and places of that sort. There is, in fact, a direct relationship.

So, it is our belief that we should have a strategy, and DEA strategy is, basically three-prong. No. 1, we want to identify, investigate, and immobilize the command and control structures of these organizations. We want to put the leaders in jail wherever they might be. Second, we want to address national issues, such as what we're seeing right now with heroin and methamphetamine problems. We want to give special attention to those. Third, we want to attack drug-related violence in the United States—on the streets of our cities and communities around the country.

I think we also have to understand that most of DEA's successes over the years have come through the initiation of domestic investigations. The law enforcement activities that took place, largely, in the United States and then led us to the sources of supply in foreign countries. We saw that with the Medellin Cartel. We saw that, I think, to a large degree with the Cali Cartel. We saw that in Southeast Asia with Operation Tiger Trap, where we identified the

heroin kingpins. Indicted them. Extradited them back to face United States justice, and as a result, we're seeing much, much less Southeast Asian heroin trafficking in the United States now.

So, what we believe in, and I very strongly believe this, is that we must have a balanced approach. We have to have resources, not only overseas—and that's very important that we work overseas, and that we work along side our foreign counterparts. That we try to give them the information, the motivation, the training, in some cases, the resources that they need to do their job. But, we also must have a concentrated approach and focus on the domestic aspect. We must know where in the United States those organizations—which, by the way, are controlled largely from outside the United States—We have to know where they're operating in the United States. Who the operatives are, and then we have to continually work toward those command and control structures.

So, the answer to where we would put our resources is, basically, I think, that we would want to buildup our investigative capability in the United States, since it's so directly related. And, we would also want to have a concurrent buildup of resources in the key overseas areas. Right now, I think we would, probably, choose to beef up more—put more resources in the Caribbean, because there are many problems there. I think, that we are a bit understaffed there, and underequipped there. I think that we would like to expand into more medium-sized cities and communities in the United States where we could feed these international investigations from those types of communities.

With regard to what kinds of things we need, Congressman. I don't have a hard, fast number of the number of agents that we would like to see, but we, sort of, have an outside goal in a few years of DEA having a 6,000 or so special agent work force. We think that's realistic. We think that would give us what we need domestically to feed those investigations. We think that would give us what we need internationally, and that's based on the current threat.

One big thing that we do need—which I will comment on just briefly. We need the continued ability to conduct court-authorized wiretaps on the communication systems of these command and control figures throughout the United States and the world, in fact. And, encryption is a very big issue now. Digital telephony is a very big issue now. There are a lot of debates going on. I know that there is some congressional interest in that, and that's a key thing to DEA and other law enforcement agencies that we do not lose our ability to track the communications of these traffickers.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

I'd like to take a few minutes and ask both of you, gentlemen, some questions. I hope I'm not repetitive to anything the chairman's done, since I was voting.

First of all, Mr. Marshall, and you're the DEA Deputy Administrator, last year Tom Constantine, the head of DEA, was testifying to Congress that there's not a single, Mexican law enforcement agency that DEA fully trusts. That pretty much paraphrased his testimony to us. That's March 17, 1997. What's your assessment today?

Mr. MARSHALL. Well, Congressman, you have to understand, and I did comment in my opening statement, on the power, and the wealth of the international drug organizations; their power to intimidate; their power to threaten; their power to bribe.

Mr. MICA. That's not my question, though. My question is, is there a single, Mexican law enforcement agency that DEA fully trusts?

Mr. MARSHALL. There has been improvement since the administrator testified at this time last year. And, frankly, it's a difficult road for the Mexican law enforcement institutions for the reasons that I have referred with the power of the organizations. But, there is now a small cadre of Mexican law enforcement organizations with whom we are cooperating, with whom we have seen some hope for success, and it is my belief that we have a core there. And, if we can keep, or if the Mexican Government can keep their commitment, maintain their commitment, and build and expand, substantially by the way, I think there is some hope there. And, there has been some improvement.

Mr. MICA. Well, the week of the 27th, I have a report that the director opposed commending Mexico's anti-drug efforts. In fact, I think there was—I even heard reports of a shouting contest between him and other folks that wanted to certify Mexico. And then, I understand that there's a memorandum that exists in DEA on the situation of Mexico and it paints a relentlessly pessimistic assessment of the country's counternarcotics effort and dismisses many reported gains as superficial steps.

Now, you've just testified that you've got a small cadre of cooperation, and yet, the information I have is that the director—let's see. I don't know what's today, the 12th. The director is saying in the last 2 weeks, they're submitting their testimony to Congress to the contrary.

Is this correct that the situation in Mexico is being painted, giving a pessimistic assessment of the country's counternarcotics effort and the administrator dismissing any reported gains?

Mr. MARSHALL. I think we have to distinguish, Congressman, between procedural progress and the efforts that the Mexican Government is making, which—and that's where I refer to the progress. They have set up units with whom we can work, and we do have to distinguish that, however, against real law enforcement results. And, what the administrator is referring to is a lack of law enforcement results. And, it's not an easy answer, sir. There have been few, if any, significant organizations, organizations' heads that have been arrested, with the exception of Fuentes, and ultimately, we have to measure the progress by their ability to identify and immobilize these drug-trafficking cartels. And, there has been, fairly little of that type of result. We need more progress in extradition. We need them to return——

Mr. MICA. Well, the press reports that the report that you all produced and I quote "uncovers significant corruption of law enforcement officials, and is the primary reason there has been no meaningful progress in drug law enforcement in Mexico." Now, is that an accurate portrayal of what you're telling us?

Mr. MARSHALL. Corruption continues to be a problem, not only in Mexico, but in many other countries around the world. And,

what we try to distinguish, Congressman, and I think the administrator—if you look in the totality of his statements, I think that the administrator would recognize and acknowledge that there have been some gains in Mexico, but, sir, that there have been very few substantial law enforcement results.

Mr. MICA. But, by your comment just now, you've thrown Mexico—you said Mexico and other countries' corruption. And, let me quote further from the report, "due to endemic corruption, violence, and the unabated growth of the drug-trafficking syndicates in Mexico." Is this something that's inaccurately reported by the press or—and I don't want drag other countries in. I want to talk about Mexico. What's the story?

Mr. MARSHALL. Well, yes, corruption is a significant problem, and that's why I wanted to preface my remarks with the power, the wealth, the influence of the Mexican cartels. Corruption is a tremendous problem in Mexico and the Mexican Government has acknowledged that. And they have, in fact, for that and other reasons, made very little progress toward immobilizing the trafficking organizations.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Marshall, I got us up to 2 weeks ago. This is this weekend. "According to U.S. law enforcement and Congressional sources, the combined U.S.-Mexico law enforcement units organized to gather intelligence and attack the drug cartels are in shambles. For the past 14 months, agents from the DEA, FBI, U.S. Customs Service were to form the background of the U.S. portion of the force that refused to cross the border because they are not allowed to carry weapons in Mexico." Is this just a—is this true or——

Mr. MARSHALL. Let me just give you the whole——

Mr. MICA. Is it accurate?

Mr. MARSHALL [continuing]. Let me give you the whole story. No, sir, it's not totally accurate.

First of all, the bilateral border task forces are in fact not operating as they were designed to operate. They have been plagued by problems with financing from the Mexican Government side. There is in fact a very major issue of security. DEA, FBI and Customs agents operated—or were formerly operating—but are no longer operating in those task forces. It's not a matter of agents from any of those agencies refusing to participate—it's a matter of agency policy which really dictates that until we solve those security issues, we are not allowing our agents to participate.

Mr. MICA. Well, let's—OK—I'm glad you mentioned the bilateral border task force. When they were initially formed, the United States and Mexican officials agreed, as I understand it, that the performance of the task force would be a yardstick by which to measure cooperation between the two nations. That monitoring the success of the task force was included in the White House's National Drug Control Strategy Report which was issued to us in February. Your director told Congress last week that regretfully the task forces were never really implemented. He cited two reasons for blaming the failure. One was corruption, and one was lack of security. You're telling me that there's a third factor in the lack—the one you mentioned was the lack of the Mexicans to provide financial support to the effort.

Mr. MARSHALL. That was a problem early on, Congressman. It is my understanding that the Mexicans have finally broken free the funding for those task forces and the Mexicans have also staffed those task forces with personnel who have passed a vetting process and who are very inexperienced but they have attempted to maintain some degree of integrity there. The primary obstacle that is preventing the full participation of U.S. agencies is the security issue right now.

Mr. MICA. Well the other question I have really provoked the view, in particularly for General Wilhelm. If you give me—can you give me a country-by-country rundown of what you need—what you would need—to accomplish our goal which is to basically win this war. You can start with Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Panama, or any of the other areas. You can do that now if you want to summarize it, you can submit it to us, but I want to see in writing what you want us to do. We provided DEA with everything on their wish list. We provided Customs—well, I don't want to say everything—but darn close to it. You said if you were fighting a war and given the resources, you could win it. I want to see submitted to this committee, either in testimony, abbreviated or written, that request list if I may, and not altered by your other folks. We want to see—we set the policy that we're in this thing to win. We need to know from you what it's going to take to do that. Can you do that?

General WILHELM. Sir, I don't think it would probably be of very good use, nor do I really think that I could do a respectable job of trying to rack out the precise requirements for 31 countries here.

Mr. MICA. We'll limit it to four.

General WILHELM. OK, sir. I would probably not be doing you much of a service or the country's or Southern Command's if I just presented you a list of platforms. There are a couple of things we need to think about when we look at this problem.

It requires a strategy. It requires a campaign plan more than it requires just a specified number of certain kinds of platforms. We need to address this problem in a regional and in a hemispheric context because where borders meet in the Andean ridge, things that we do in Peru are going to have an effect on Colombia. Things that we do in Bolivia are going to affect both Colombia and Peru. What I really need to provide you—and what I will provide you—is an overarching strategic plan which will include in it the capabilities that we require to achieve the strategic objectives that I'm talking about. We will provide that, sir, and we will stay in touch with your staff. I can't give you a precise date, but we won't make this *War and Peace.* We'll construct it as fast as we can and get you a good working product just as quickly as we can.

Mr. MICA. That's as specific——

General WILHELM. Beyond what I've already said about that issue, sir, I'd like to submit something for the record.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

Mr. HASTERT [presiding]. Thank you, gentlemen. The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Barr.

Mr. BARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Wilhelm, a couple of years ago, I participated as an observer in a trip down to the Caribbean from the MAG–42 at Dobbins Air Reserve Base in my district. I've tried to keep in touch

with the folks that participated and that were conducting Operation Weedeater. A very successful drug eradication—marijuana eradication program in the Caribbean. The statistics on what our reservists were able to do on those weeks and weekends in which they were down there is absolutely staggering. In speaking with one of the officers of MAG–42 just recently, I was informed that there are no more funds available under Title 10. I believe those funds were made available for those efforts. Are you familiar with those funds for programs like Operation Weedeater? I doubt that the removal of those funds came from the Marine Corps because I think they were aware of the fact that it's a very, very successful, very efficient program. Where did the decision come from to cut out those funds?

General WILHELM. Congressman Barr, I'm very familiar with Weedeater and very familiar with MAG–42. My last command, of course, was Marine Corps Forces Atlantic. So in fact, I directed those operations. I will correct this on the record, if I'm wrong, sir, but I believe the problem lies in the necessary flight hours and appropriations to support—this is within the service budget—to support these requirements. The performance of the reserve establishment in support of our counter drug operations across the page has been superb.

Mr. BARR. I agree.

General WILHELM. We send about 51,000 people down range—as we refer to it—each year and about 40 percent of those are reservists.

Mr. BARR. This being the problem, where specifically would those of us who support the program and would like to see it started up again, direct our attention?

General WILHELM. Again, sir, my belief is that the deficiency is in the flight hour program for the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing and MAG–42. However, I would like to confirm that and get back to you with some budget level specifics on what does limit the capabilities of MAG–42. That is part of it and I believe the other part of it are other taskings for the group.

Mr. BARR. OK.

General WILHELM. But I would like to go on the record, sir, and give you a precise answer.

Mr. BARR. OK, that will be fine and that would stand on protocol—I mean, if you just have somebody call me or call our office because I want to do whatever we can because it's a tremendous program.

General WILHELM. Wilco, sir, I agree and the reservists love it because it's real world stuff, not just punching holes in the air.

Mr. BARR. Exactly. Thank you. If I could now focus—have a quick question here. Mr. Marshall, I'm comparing the National Drug Control Strategy for 1997 and the National Drug Control Strategy for 1998. There's a small, but I think important, omission in the section that has to do with efforts to legalize marijuana. The 1997 strategy states: "We must continue to oppose efforts to legalize marijuana." That language was taken out in the 1998 submission. Does DEA concur in the downgrading of the administration's opposition to legalizing marijuana?

Mr. MARSHALL. Sir, I—it is DEA's position that marijuana should not be legalized for a number of reasons.

Mr. BARR. And is it fair to say that the DEA continues to oppose efforts to legalize marijuana?

Mr. MARSHALL. Well, we look at that, sir, as more of a legislative decision, but I think that we certainly recognize that there are dangers in doing that. I apologize—I can't—I don't know how active we are in getting out in the community and opposing that because that—we think that maybe that message is better carried by others rather than law enforcement, but we are opposed to legalization efforts.

Mr. BARR. And there are no plans by DEA to change their opposition to efforts to legalize marijuana?

Mr. MARSHALL. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Mr. BARR. I mean, are there or aren't there? I hope not.

Mr. MARSHALL. No, sir.

Mr. BARR. OK, thank you. General, I have had the opportunity twice over the last year to travel down to Panama—most recently in January. We were briefed by the folks at the—unfortunately very small remaining United States facilities in Panama. One of the topics that we discussed at length—not only with our military personnel there—but also with civilians in Panama, including Government officials in Panama, is the possibility of establishing both—something that's important in its own right as well as something that would help some United States presence in Panama which the Panamian people apparently in very large numbers would like to see happen—is the establishment of a multi-national counter drug center there. What is the status of those efforts from our Government's standpoint? Is that something that our Government supports as part of its overall anti-drug effort?

General WILHELM. Yes sir. We do support that and I certainly support it as the regional combatant/commander responsible for the Caribbean and Central and South America. The status of the negotiations right now, sir, is pretty murky. As I answered in response to a previous question as early as about Christmas Eve, we really thought we were on the cusp of an agreement with the Panamanians for a multi-national counter drug center at what we now know as Howard Air Force Base. In the intervening weeks, a number of changes have taken place. The Panamanians have changed their negotiating position and recently they swapped out their entire negotiating team. Now their Minister of Foreign Relations, Mr. Arias, is heading the team—replacing Dr. Jorge Ritter who was their previous senior negotiator. As you may know, sir, we established four hard points for the negotiation. These were conditions that we demanded be met for us to retain the presence and participate in the MCC which I suspect you're aware, sir, was actually an initiative that was proposed by the President of Panama.

We said we had to have adequate quality of life for our people; assured force protection; the command and control relationships had to leave U.S. forces under a U.S. commander; and importantly, we said we need multi-mission capabilities there. We addressed things like humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, search and rescue—the kinds of things that, of course, we've done throughout the hemisphere for a great many years.

As I mentioned, as early as December—even January, we felt we were very close to an agreement. My most recent conversations with Ambassador Bill Hughes, in Panama and with Ambassador Ted McNamara, lead me to believe that we're pretty far away right now, sir.

Mr. BARR. If I could, Mr. Chairman, if you'd allow me to indulge just one followup question to that. Is this something that our Government here in Washington is interested in pursuing? I know the Ambassador is. I've talked with him and I think that's very sincere and I think our military are. I'm wondering about the folks here in Washington. Does there seem to be some real interest in movement in this regard or not?

General WILHELM. Sir, there really does. Across the board, we've seen some very—it was classified correspondence, but we've seen some very strong support for this from Capitol Hill and I suspect you're aware of that. As the principle—as the guy, I guess with the largest dog in the fight in the Department of Defense—I'm strongly on board and have made it a point of repeated discussion with Secretary Cohen. The folks that I work with over in ARA and State Department—Ambassador Jeff Davidow, Ambassador Pete Romero—also share my conviction and that of Ambassador Ted McNamara that this is truly important to us. It's very important to the subject of this hearing in my judgment—our counter drug operations.

The runway at Howard Air Fore Base really is at the strategic center of what we're doing. To try to conduct the kinds of missions that we conduct, particularly with our air platforms from the continental United States, we burn 75 percent of their effectiveness in transit time. In addition to all of that, there's the reality of geography. Panama is the ideal secure location to conduct operations in South America from. Of course, coupled with that is the very, very well-developed base structure that we've built there since 1903.

Mr. BARR. Where were you in 1979 when we needed you?

General WILHELM. Let's see, sir. I think I was in Europe.

Mr. BARR. Has the Secretary of Defense personally weighed-in with this—with the Panamanians—to illustrate to them just how important at the highest levels of our administration this is?

General WILHELM. Sir, I honestly don't know whether Secretary Cohen has had a direct dialog with the Panamanians. I would say he has been very supportive of me.

Mr. BARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HASTERT. Thank you, gentleman from Florida. General, we were talking about Colombia and the problems with the threat to democracy there—more than just the people of Colombia and of course the center of the drug trade—marijuana and now heroin, with the poppy growth there. But there's really a regional threat. Could you give us an assessment of what the disruption in Colombia could mean to Panama and Ecuador and Venezuela and that whole region? What are we looking at and what is the potential problem there?

General WILHELM. Sir, that's an issue that concerns me greatly as you well know from having visited the region. There are five nations that have shared borders with Colombia and every one of them is being affected in one way or another. At my last count, I

believe the Venezuelans had somewhere between 10,000 and 12,000 troops on the border trying to protect their sovereignty and to prevent incursions by the insurgents in league with the narco traffickers from crossing over into Venezuela.

Brazil, which for a very long period of time, really kind of resisted the notion that there was a significant problem in their country. Of course, now acknowledge that they've become a transshipment point for narcotics flowing out of Colombia and out of the Andean ridge for further transport to the United States, the Caribbean and then even on the way to Europe.

Panama, in the Darien province has experienced severe problems and they've had cross-border incursions by, not only insurgents and narco traffickers, but by the very notorious para-militaries, as well.

Venezuela has similar concerns as—excuse me, Ecuador—has similar concerns as Venezuela. They've put less forces against it because of their border dispute with Peru. So as you go around the horns, sir, I call it the spreading stain out of Colombia. Perhaps their democracies are not threatened to the same extent as Colombia's is but, of course, it is deducting away resources that could be used for the betterment of the populations and for the strengthening of the young democracies in all of those countries. So it is very, very much a regional problem—not a country problem—in my judgment.

Mr. HASTERT. General, a couple of weeks ago, we had a discussion about assessing what needs are and what shortcomings are. I'm not asking you to lay this out now, but could you provide us with what correspondence that you can furnish this committee on this issue between Customs and SOUTHCOM and the Joint Interagency Task Force in the South and the drug enforcement policy and support related to the withdrawal of any Department of Treasury or interagency detection and monitoring of intelligence assets? Like I said, if you would provide that to us, I would appreciate it.

[The information referred to follows:]

Number of drug defendants processed in the Federal criminal justice system, by stage of process, 1984-96

Year	Investigations by U.S. attorneys(a)	Filings in U.S. district court(a)	Terminations in U.S. district court(b)	Convictions(b)
1984	15899	11224	11361	8898
1985	18022	12576	12984	10289
1986	21930	14952	14746	11984
1987	n/a	17729	16443	13423
1988	28750	19725	18710	13376
1989	33176	24278	19750	15799
1990	33082	25094	20035	16311
1991	n/a	25863	21203	17349
1992	36802	28479	22728	18846
1993	32790	25661	24127	20468
1994	29311	19427	21584	16400
1995	31686	21446	19589	14778
1996	30227	21548	19742	17365

Notes: Statistics represent suspects/defendants processed at the particular stage identified. Statistics are not comparable across stages for a particular year.
(a) Data source: Executive Office for the U.S. Attorneys, Central system data file, annual.
(b) Data source: Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Criminal master file, annual.
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Compendium of Federal Justice Statistics, annual.

General WILHELM. Certainly, sir. I'll tell you right off hand, I know the subject that we're talking about. Of course, it's refocusing of some assets, particularly Customs resources into the continental United States. So I'll have to do a file search to do that, but, of course, sir, I'll certainly be pleased to do that.

Mr. HASTERT. I understand that and I would appreciate that.

General WILHELM. Yes, sir.

Mr. HASTERT. Gentleman from DEA. First of all, I'm going through your testimony. Just to underline the type of people we're dealing with—in your testimony, Mr. Marshall, you said smugglers from the Dominican Republic have gained a notorious reputation for the disregard of human life. They have been known to use horrific diversionary tactics of throwing illegal aliens overboard from a drug-carrying boat to evade impending U.S. Coast Guard boarding, knowing that the U.S. Coast Guard will halt their pursuit to rescue those thrown overboard. Has that happened on a regular basis or is that——

Mr. MARSHALL. I'm not sure that there's more than one or two instances of that, sir. Admiral Kramek could perhaps comment on that a bit more—but yes, that's one of the techniques that they use. They have been—the Dominicans have become as the Colombians and Mexicans—very, very ruthless and that's one example.

Mr. HASTERT. Yes, I had asked the General—the Admiral—about the situation in Cuba. I want to ask you the same question. What evidence is there, if any, that there is actually a drug trade—not only airplanes using the corridors over Cuba, but actually involvement of the Cuban Government in the drug situation?

Mr. MARSHALL. Well, it's difficult, Congressman, for us to get a real handle on what is actually going in Cuba with regard to any official collaboration or corruption and that sort of stuff because we simply don't have the access that we need.

We hear reports that they are using those air corridors. We know that the maritime smugglers go in close proximity to Cuba and use the Cuban waters as a safe haven. We hear reports from time to time that there is official collusion, collaboration and corruption in the drug trade. However, I don't believe that we have at this point any substantial amount of hard evidence that the government itself is involved. We know that there are probably individual people—Government officials that are involved. We simply don't know to the extent that we would like to the depth of that involvement.

There have been some individual instances actually even of cooperation by the Cuban Government. The Admiral—Admiral Kramek—made reference to the *Limerick* wherein they came in and testified. They also gave us back the defendants and the cocaine from the *Limerick*. So I would have to assess Cuba as really a kind of a mixed bag right now with a large dearth of—scarcity of information as to what the real situation is there. I hope that we can get more—a more tighter assessment on that within the next foreseeable future.

Mr. HASTERT. I thank the gentleman. Gentleman from Wisconsin. Mr. Barrett.

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just to clarify for both the General and Mr. Marshall, as to whether our Government be-

lieves there is any Cuban Government involvement in drug smuggling there.

Mr. MARSHALL. We, indeed, do not have any proof that there is actual Cuban Government collaboration/cooperation——

Mr. BARRETT. You say proof. Is there a suspicion that there is?

Mr. MARSHALL. There have been allegations from time to time, but we have not been able to substantiate any of them.

Mr. BARRETT. General Wilhelm.

General WILHELM. Sir, we have fundamentally the same position. We haven't been able to get—develop—any hard indications of collaborations. We do, of course, assess Cuba's military capabilities and we know that they are just drastically reduced over what we knew several years ago. That's significant because they don't really have the capability to survey their own airspace or their territorial waters, but again, sir, we have—I have received no indications that there is formal collaboration between the government and the traffickers.

Mr. BARRETT. I'd like to get back to the situation in Mexico because it troubles me if our DEA agents, in particular, won't travel over the border because of their inability to carry firearms. Is that correct? If you could sort of bring me up to speed on what's going on.

Mr. MARSHALL. I'd like to clarify, first of all, that it's not a matter of any DEA agents—FBI customs agents—refusing to travel, it is agency policy that we have not allowed our agents for probably close to a year now to do that type of cross-border travel because of the issue of personal security. There are many, many threats against our agents. There are generally threats against United States and Mexican law enforcement in general. There are a lot of kidnappings, murders—that sort of stuff—in Mexico. We've had threats against DEA agents on both sides of the border. It is an issue which remains an impediment, but it's an issue that we hope to work with the Mexican Government and get a resolution to the security of our agents.

Mr. BARRETT. Have you lobbied for pressure from the administration to put pressure on Mexico. It seems unacceptable if our DEA agents—because of the policy of the DEA—not crossing the border.

Mr. MARSHALL. Congressman, as far as any in-depth discussion of that issue in an open forum, it is a sensitive issue between us and the Government of Mexico and I would prefer to address that in another forum.

Mr. BARR. I would ask that we do that, please.

Mr. MARSHALL. Be happy to, sir.

Mr. BARR. Colombia—tried to figure out the balance. My feeling—I think the feeling for many is that the national police is very highly regarded both in its ability to perform counter-narcotics and its human rights accord. Do you think—and maybe General you can answer this—do you think that the police who are all in counter-narcotics should be expanded in Colombia? What balance do you think we should be trying to achieve there?

General WILHELM. Congressman Barrett, I think really that this is, of course, principally a decision that's been made by the Government of Colombia—I think the balance is about right. They've got some good people working the problem. General Jose Serrano, in

my judgment, is a top-flight man. He does a great job. Colonel Gallego, who I think may have testified, or at least visited this committee, is also a very good man. I think their integrity is unimpeachable and I think their track record kind of speaks for itself.

I have some concerns about the Colombian armed forces. This is a delicate marriage when you take a look at the threat that they confront. Right now, we carry the FARC with about 12,000 members, the National Liberation Army (ELN) with about 8,000—so that's about 20,000 armed resisters out in the less-inhabited regions of the country where the problem really exists. The Colombian armed forces do not have a good track record right now and they had a serious reverse last week. I think that's something that we need to work on. Sometimes countries get painted with broad brushes. I will tell you I know an awful lot of very, very good people in the Colombian armed forces. Frequently, I think they get smudged a little bit by perhaps some of the reputations of more senior people in their Government.

They have some problems. They're problems that I hope that we can help them with. But I think until we achieve a really effective marriage of capabilities which with HNP which I think is in a pretty state of—excuse me, the CNP—we're not in Haiti, we're in Colombia. With the armed forces, I think we're going to have a very difficult time conducting the kind of integrated operations with the kind of security that we need on the ground to make the progress that we need to make in Colombia. That's why I mentioned I was encouraged by the national interest waiver that was granted to Colombia. I hope that's going to enable us to get a little bit closer to the problem with the Colombia armed forces.

Mr. BARRETT. Do you think that was a positive step?

General WILHELM. I most definitely think it was, sir.

Mr. BARRETT. I recently read an article—if I could just continue this for a moment, Mr. Chairman—about President Samper and attempts that he is making to reverse the policy that the Congress down there passed relating to extradition. Our objection, obviously, was that it was not retroactive. That he's even trying to order that down now. Is that accurate from your perspective? What's the situation there with——

General WILHELM. Sir, I suspect you and I are probably reading just about the same things through the same channels. I don't have any information probably beyond what you have for that and I don't know how much of that is fact and how much is supposition; but we have heard the same things.

Mr. BARRETT. Mr. Marshall?

Mr. MARSHALL. I'm not—I don't have any information about the President's involvement in trying to strengthen or undo or whatever—I simply can't answer that question. I will say that the extradition decision was a limited, at best, decree for us because it was not retroactive. I referred many times here today to the importance of having these criminals come back to face U.S. justice because this frankly is the thing that they fear most. I think that the—you know—Colombian position on that and the Mexican record too, for that matter, we have a long way to go.

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HASTERT. Gentleman from Florida. Mr. Mica.

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. When I came to Congress in 1993, I believe Colombia was the source of about 10 percent of the heroin that we were seeing. I think you testified today—is heroin up to 52 percent?

Mr. MARSHALL. Yes.

Mr. MICA. Now, I went to Colombia with the chairman in 1996. We were told that the heroin is on its way. In fact they gave us reports of 10,000 hectares of poppies being grown. They begged us for equipment. We had the decertification and we had asked for waivers continually from this committee on and on. Now we're up to 52 percent. Did you testify to that—52 percent?

Mr. MARSHALL. Yes, sir; 52 percent of the seizures in—of the heroin seizures in the United States are——

Mr. MICA. I'm also told now that we're reaching a comparability where heroin will be as cheap as cocaine. Is that——

Mr. MARSHALL. Well, I'm not sure that that's probably——

Mr. MICA. But we're heading——

Mr. MARSHALL. But certainly it's cheaper and the Colombian heroin is higher purity and lower-priced than most of the competitors on the market. I'm not sure I would go quite to the comparison——

Mr. MICA. My central Florida area has a tidal wave of it and it's everywhere.

Mr. MARSHALL. Absolutely. There's no question about it.

Mr. MICA. Plano, TX had a similar public response where they've had teens dying. We've had—I think 19 heroin overdoses—maybe we're in the 20 range now. It's all been predictable. We've been begging for these waivers. Now, I understand that the administration gave—and we talked to General Serrano. He told me the reason—you said he's trusted, a trusted ally, but he says he doesn't have the parts, the equipment, the ammunition—whatever it takes to fight this. Now the administration just decertified with a waiver. I talked to Myles Frechette—he's gone now. The stuff was on the way. It was going to be approved and the stuff still isn't there. What the hell is going on?

Mr. MARSHALL. Congressman, it is in fact——

Mr. MICA. And you testified today that Colombia is a disaster.

Mr. MARSHALL. It is DEA's position that we would like to see more opium poppy eradication in Colombia. There are competing interests. Those are actually State Department, INL assets and this is a vigorous debate.

Mr. MICA. It's still not there. We all felt that they're moving because now we have some air. We went out in the jungle there after the fiasco with the administration on the shoot-down policy and we got that put back into place. And President—we met with the President of Peru and they're shooting down the bastards. Now—and we knew that they were going to riverine strategy. I still have people who tell me that the boats and stuff that were ordered for this riverine strategy that still haven't even been moved forward with. What's going on? What's going on with the other riverine strategy, General?

General WILHELM. We sure do, sir.

Mr. MICA. Have anything in place?

General WILHELM. Right now, yes, sir, we do.

Mr. MICA. In Colombia?

General WILHELM. First—no, sir. First phase is Peru. It's a well-designed program.

Mr. MICA. We were there, but he just testified 52 percent is coming through Colombia.

General WILHELM. Fifty-two percent of the heroin seized in the United States has its origins in Colombia. Back to the rivers. I've been working rivers since 1989 with the Colombians. We've had a number of programs, but in my judgment, we haven't always done it right.

Mr. MICA. They don't have the equipment though yet—do they have a boat?

General WILHELM. They have equipment. They have—some of the equipment is indigenous—but I will tell you, sir, they do not have a good life cycle maintenance program. They can't sustain operations. They have not bought consumables at the same rate that they've bought end items. These are things we need to fix.

Sir, I'd like to answer your question because we have a good program that is just starting right now and the initial center of effort is at the Nanay Naval Base, which is about 1 mile from the juncture of the Nanay and the Amazon Rivers.

Mr. MICA. I'd appreciate—it's just starting—I'd appreciate a quarterly report, or whatever, to the committee because I've been on this subcommittee. I even came when I wasn't a member and asked these questions when they were taking these programs apart. Now we're putting them back together again. So, we're trying to help you. We want to see these things done, but it's very frustrating when I call and say is the equipment there and they say no. I asked General Serrano do you have it? No. We've talked to others and they say it's on its way. So we want to make certain that the policy that we're advocating is implemented and there's no shortage of cash here. We'll get the cash to do it, but the——

General WILHELM. Sir, thanks to this committee, we've got a $77.5 million program that's underway right now with the first $16 million in the program this year to build 13 riverine interdiction units in Peru which has no riverine capabilities. Right on the heels of that, we're going to go into Colombia and start overhauling what we built. I would tell you as one of the people involved in building it, we built it imperfectly. That's partly my fault. We're going to overhaul that so that they develop sustainable capabilities. It's a good program, sir.

Mr. MICA. I'm all for——

General WILHELM. You helped build it.

Mr. MICA. Exactly. If you could give us a quarterly report because I——

General WILHELM. Sir, you've got it.

Mr. MICA. I want to make sure that what we ask you to do and say you're doing—that it gets done. Mr. Marshall, the last report I had from the Attorney General's office is probably 2 years old, but it indicated a 12 percent drop in Federal drug prosecution. Can you provide the committee with an update as to where we have been in drug prosecutions over the last 3 years? Can you provide us with that?

Mr. MARSHALL. I would have to get that from the Department of Justice and submit it. Yes, sir, I will.

Mr. MICA. Can you give me your estimate of what's going on—or opinion. Because you can do all you want in enforcement and if they aren't prosecuting these folks and we have a drop in it—you testified that the best deterrent—we had testimony that the best deterrent is extradition enforcement. They fear the United States—they face U.S. justice—"they fear the U.S. criminal justice system." But that has to put people behind bars. The other thing too is you have to have extradition. We have 20—28 outstanding extraditions for felonies. Has Mexico—do we have one single person that's a major drug trafficker involved in a drug felony—been extradited to your knowledge?

Mr. MARSHALL. There have not been any extraditions of Mexican drug traffickers who would be considered major drug traffickers. No, sir, there have not.

Mr. MICA. So that hasn't changed at all, but again your testimony says that they—the best deterrent was they faced extradition and U.S. justice. As far as Mexico, they don't fear that because nobody's coming our way.

Mr. MARSHALL. At the present time, unfortunately, sir, you're right.

Mr. HASTERT. I thank the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. I have another round of—General, one of the things to followup on this—when we were in Peru, we stopped at Iquitos and visited the Admiral up on the Amazon——

General WILHELM. Yes, sir.

Mr. HASTERT. It's a big place. It's difficult to sort out what's what moving on that river and even thought you're 2,300 or 2,400 miles from the mouth of that river where it dumps into the Atlantic Ocean—that river in some places is a mile wide and just impossible to sort out. Are we developing that riverine source there? Has there been a development since last year?

General WILHELM. Yes, sir, there has. That's what I had started to mention to Congressman Mica. In fact, this is a good time to be talking about it because a joint and combined team of trainers is in place right now starting the initial training of the first of the Peruvian instructors who will train their riverine interdiction units. As I mentioned due in large measure to a lot of the work done by this committee, that's an adequately funded program which goes all the way through the future years' defense program and it's got over $77 million against the requirement.

By the end of this year, we will have fielded the first of the Peruvian riverine interdiction units which will contain everything from the patrol craft required to work the Amazon, the Nanay, and the rest of the waterways that make up the Amazon basin in Peru. We will have our support craft necessary to sustain them and three mobile support bases. As you point out, sir, you have to see the Amazon to appreciate it. It's an inland ocean, not a river. So the question might be what possible difference can 13 riverine interdiction units make?

Well, rivers, just like land masses have choke points and that's what we're looking at right now. We've done a pretty good intelligence estimate, I think, of what the narcotics trafficking patterns are on the river. We're pretty confident this is going to make a difference. What we need to do now, that we failed to do in the past,

is develop a capability that sustains itself over time as opposed to having a bunch of boats with unserviceable motors up over the high water mark on the river 18 months after we've completed the training event.

Not to make this answer too long, but one of the things that I've stressed in Southern Command is once we start this, we're not ending it. We'll send a Mobile Training Team or a riverine training team down range to work on tactics. In back of that, we'll send a Joint Planning Assistance Team to make sure that operational planning is being done in a responsible way and that the operations that are conducted are going against the most promising intelligence. On the back end of that, we'll put a technical assistance team of mainly only a few people in, but they'll take a very tough look at things like maintenance and sustaining the force. So what we're after is something that works over time. With the funding that's behind this program, I think we can do it.

Mr. HASTERT. General, last year we visited SOUTHCOM before you took over that command, we visited—had an extended visit and productive visit with General Clark. Of course you know, he was very interested in "winning" this war—some don't want to use the word war. In that, he said that there—if we combined the use of intelligence gathering we had—heat sensing devices—get through triple canopy forests and sends out where these mega labs are which are deep into the jungles down along the Ecuadorian and Peruvian border. We know from the sky we can identify where the poppy fields are, but quite frankly in my estimation—and I want your assessment of this, the Colombian army and the Colombian national police who, in my view are heroic folks in the jobs that they do. They just don't have the lift power or they don't have the fire power to go in and to be able to take out those mega labs or get up safely into the high altitudes to eradicate poppy fields. And of course, if we can eradicate the poppy fields with the technologies that we have today—with herbicides and other things, then we don't have to worry about trying to stop that thing—that stuff coming across their border. If those people had more helicopters, more lift power—could they get the job done?

General WILHELM. Sir, that could definitely, I think, improve on their performance. Now, you hit the two things that I think they're most inefficient on. They're most inefficient on intelligence and they're most inefficient on mobility. As I mentioned in response to a previous question, there are no road networks. The poppies grow at a higher altitude which is demanding on rotary wing airplanes. So they need the right kinds of sustainable platforms to do the work they—helicopters—to do the work that they need to do. I think you put your fingers squarely onto their most urgent requirements.

Mr. HASTERT. Thank you. Gentleman from Wisconsin. Gentleman from Florida.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. Let me go back to Colombia, if I may. Did I hear somebody testify today that was there 10,000 or 20,000 guerrillas—somebody give me some guerrilla numbers.

General WILHELM. Yes, sir. I did.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

General WILHELM. 12,000 in the FARC; 8,000 in the ELN.

Mr. MICA. OK. Are they being financed primarily by leftist groups—Cuba, remnants of the former Soviet Union?

General WILHELM. Not at all, sir. They're self-sustaining based primarily on their alliance with the narco traffickers.

Mr. MICA. So then their money is coming—you're testifying to me that they've the cash to buy—sounds like they've got some pretty sophisticated weaponry, even communications. The slaughter that was reported recently detailed a rather sophisticated military capability. Is that correct?

General WILHELM. Sir, that's very correct.

Mr. MICA. And the money is coming from narco trafficking but would you say 80–90 percent probably of the money to get this equipment? I mean they're not—when you say self-sustaining living in the jungle—you know, you're not going to trade bananas for weapons—it's drugs for weapons, and cash?

General WILHELM. I think that's a very fair statement, sir. I don't know precisely what percentage of their total cash revenues come from dealings with the narco traffickers, but we know it's the vast majority of it.

Mr. MICA. Well, the problem I have with the administration's position has been—one of the things they've held up the equipment on and parts and other even—boats and things of that sort has been human rights violations and they're afraid that the military might use some of these. But it sounds like the military is pretty well-armed by narco traffickers according to your testimony.

General WILHELM. The insurgents?

Mr. MICA. The insurgents.

General WILHELM. Yes, sir. Your point on El Billar last week is very well taken. We know that they had mortars, rocket propel grenades. They had machine gunners at machine guns and more communications means than the Colombian army had.

Mr. MICA. This continued disruption is—I heard testimony today—it already has the place in a—the region in a panic. I heard somebody testify that there are significant numbers of other troops along the borders in preparation if this spreads. Did someone describe this as a disastrous situation? Was that you, Mr. Marshall or did you say that—maybe I heard Kramek earlier—I'm not sure who said it, but how would you characterize it? Pretty serious?

General WILHELM. I would say that the situation in Colombia is very serious, sir. By our measurement, about 40 percent of the country is not really under the control of the Government of Colombia.

Mr. MICA. Can I ask, well—do we have a plan if this turns even worse ready to go? You're working with folks. You've got a program to go in place based on what a situation that may have been so a few months ago, now it's taken a very serious turn for the worst. Are we—do we have a contingency plan? I don't know. You don't have to get into discussion, but just maybe you could tell me if we're ready for the eventuality.

General WILHELM. Let me see, sir, if I can answer that question in a way that's appropriate for this hearing.

From a policy perspective, sir, we walk a pretty thin line in the support that we provide the Colombian armed forces. We have to make a conscious distinction on each request that comes our way.

Is this request related to counter-narcotics operations or is it related to counter-insurgency? As you would appreciate, there's quite a bit of difference between those two things.

It's frequently not easy to do because it's hard to separate the two things. The first question I asked when the situation went critical and El Billar was, what mission was the Colombian army on? I got two answers. One answer was that they were going out to take down some narcotics labs and these units were credited with destroying about 63 labs over the last year or so. Then the second report I got was that they were actually out pursuing one of the major front commanders in the FARC. It makes a big difference as to what we can do to support them as things have finally washed out, I've been told they had a dual mission. But that influences what we can do and how we do it in support of the Colombian armed forces.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, I have two real quick questions if you would indulge me.

Mr. HASTERT. Go ahead.

Mr. MICA. Can I do two? You have Haiti?

General WILHELM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MICA. We spent a fortune in Haiti building up their law enforcement, their potential for criminal justice and all that. We're getting reports that that's one of the key transshipment zones. You have a plan there that you're involved in?

General WILHELM. Yes, sir, we do. In fact, we just picked up what we call a pulse operation for Hispaniola. It involves both Haiti and the Dominican Republic and we started that on the first of this month. That will be a 92-day operation. It's kind of a companion operation. This one we call Frontier Lance. This is a follow-on to Frontier Shield which we did with Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

Mr. MICA. General, since we're just starting that one too, maybe in 90 days or 110 days, you could give us a little update. Because——

General WILHELM. Sure. Yes, sir.

Mr. MICA. I looked at that. It seems to be a problem. Finally Mr. Marshall, my last question. I've talked to dozens of DEA agents all around, not only in the States, but outside. I've asked them always do you think we should certify Mexico. I heard, and you heard, my comments that I heard of shouts from behind the closed doors recently with the administrator. What's your opinion about what we should do with Mexico? Should we certify or decertify Mexico?

General WILHELM. Congressman, we have chosen not to take a position on whether we should certify or not.

Mr. MICA. You don't want to personally comment on your opinion?

General WILHELM. I don't think it would be appropriate, sir. I believe that the DEA's position is to comment on the law enforcement capabilities and results of these individual countries and I have done a little bit of that today with regard to Mexico. We do not even make a recommendation whether they should be certified or not certified.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

Mr. HASTERT. Gentleman from Wisconsin. Just a final couple of questions and then we're going to close down. General, that is Frontier Lance—is that right?

General WILHELM. Frontier Lance and Hispaniola. Yes, sir.

Mr. HASTERT. Is that funded?

General WILHELM. Yes, sir.

Mr. HASTERT. Fully?

General WILHELM. Yes, sir.

Mr. HASTERT. General, the quadrennial defense review—you've been involved in SOUTHCOM as part of that. Has that helped or hindered your ability to work in your region?

General WILHELM. Sir, I'm not sure that it's had all that significant an impact on Southern Command. A lot of the issues that were looked at in the quadrennial defense review and then the report of the national defense panel tended to focus a bit more on the upper end of the conflict spectrum. We haven't seen any remarkable changes in resources or in other forms of support for us in our mission that I could directly attribute to the QDR or to the NDP.

Mr. HASTERT. General, we look forward to receiving that information that we talked about. I want to thank both our witnesses for being here today. I ask that the record be held open for 2 weeks for Members to submit questions for the record to our witnesses. I also ask that our witnesses respond to these questions in a timely manner, preferably within 2 weeks.

Without objection, so ordered.

With that, again, appreciation General and Mr. Marshall. Certainly appreciate your time and patience today.

The Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:36 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.]

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